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I. INTRODUCTION
When private communications companies use public rights-of-
way to conduct their business, the conditions of use are often de-
scribed as "regulation." In fact, it is not regulation that is at issue, but
rather property rights. In the last several years, this issue has been
raised most forcefully in the context of section 253 of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 ("the Act").' This Article proposes an analysis
that recognizes the importance of local property rights, and reviews
the court and agency decisions to date under section 253 from that
standpoint.
The issue of property rights in the telecommunications context
has been obscured because the property rights in question are those of
local communities such as cities and counties, not those of private par-
ties. Although property owned by local governments has the same
constitutional protection as property owned by private parties, it is not
customary to think about it in the same way. Moreover, it is often in
the interest of litigants to present the problem as one of regulation,
presumptively considered a bureaucratic interference with free enter-
prise, rather than as a matter of property, which is itself the medium
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 253, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 253, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2003)).
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and driving engine of the free market. The aim of this Article is to
show that section 253 must be understood in terms of property rights,
and that a property rights perspective provides an effective tool for
evaluating court and agency decisions with respect to that section.
This introductory section describes how section 253 works, and
notes that the importance of local right-of-way management has in-
creased since September 2001. Section II of the Article identifies the
fundamental property rights at issue, their implications for compensa-
tion requirements, and their relationship to constitutional federalism.
Section III then looks briefly at the characteristic mistake made by
many analysts: construing local communities' control of their public
rights-of-way as purely regulatory and ignoring the property aspect.
Section IV explores in more depth the way in which section 253 fits
into the structure of property rights, regulation, and federalism, by de-
tailing the legislative history of the provision. Finally, Section V re-
views the significant agency and judicial decisions to date in light of
that analysis.
A. How Section 253 Works
Section 253 of the 1996 Act is titled "Removal of Barriers to En-
try.' '2 Although its structure is relatively straightforward, that struc-
ture has not always been fully understood by the courts. Section
253(a) forbids any state or local legal requirement that would "prohibit
or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any
interstate or intrastate telecommunications service."' Subsections (b)
and (c) of section 253, however, create "safe harbors" for certain types
of state and local requirements.' Even if a rule would "prohibit or
have the effect of prohibiting" under subsection (a), it will not be pre-
empted by section 253 if it falls within the scope of (b) or (c). Finally,
subsection (d) grants the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) authority to review issues under subsections (a) and (b) alone,
but not to review issues under subsection (c).'
The full text of section 253 is as follows:
§ 253 REMOVAL TO BARRIERS OF ENTRY.
(a) IN GENERAL. No State or local statute or regulation, or
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effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any in-
terstate or intrastate telecommunications service.
(b) STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY. Nothing in this section
shall affect the ability of a State to impose, on a competitively
neutral basis and consistent with section 254 [relating to univer-
sal service], requirements necessary to preserve and advance
universal service, protect the public safety and welfare, ensure
the continued quality of telecommunications services, and safe-
guard the rights of consumers.
(c) STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY. Nothing
in this section affects the authority of a State or local government
to manage the public rights-of-way or to require fair and reason-
able compensation from telecommunications providers, on a
competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis, for use of
public rights-of-way on a nondiscriminatory basis, if the com-
pensation required is publicly disclosed by such government.
(d) PREEMPTION. If, after notice and an opportunity for public
comment, the Commission determines that a State or local gov-
ernment has permitted or imposed any statute, regulation, or le-
gal requirement that violates subsection (a) or (b), the Commis-
sion shall preempt the enforcement of such statute, regulation,
or legal requirement to the extent necessary to correct such
violation or inconsistency.
This language was adopted against the background of a long his-
tory of market restrictions (often federal) that prevented certain sorts
of companies from entering into certain markets.6 For example, prior
to 1996, local exchange telephone companies were prohibited from
owning cable companies in their service areas.7 In section 253, how-
ever, Congress sought to remove these barriers so all communications
providers could enter into all markets. In addition to directly remov-
ing federal barriers, Congress wished to eliminate state and local pub-
lic utility licensing and regulatory practices that created legal monopo-
6. See, e.g., JAMES C. GOODALE, ALL ABOUT CABLE: LEGAL AND BUSINESS ASPECTS
OF CABLE AND PAY TELEVISION § 2.15 (Law Journal Seminars-Press 1998) for a brief discus-
sion of some of the cable system cross-ownership requirements.
7. Section 533(b)(2) of the 1984 Act read:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, subject in whole or in part to subchapter
II of [the Communications Act], to provide channels of communications or pole line
conduit space, or other rental arrangements, to any entity which is directly or indi-
rectly owned by, operated by, controlled by, or under common control with such
common carrier, if such facilities or arrangements are to be used for, or in connection
with, the provision of video programming directly to subscribers in the telephone ser-
vice area of the common carrier.
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lies or protected incumbent operators from competition.' The revised
Act presumes that all telecommunications can be competitive, and
thus, subsection (a) generally preempts state and local regulations that
prohibit, or have the effect of prohibiting, the offering of a telecom-
munications service.)
To prevent this preemptive force from sweeping too broadly and
eliminating necessary and important rights, two "safe harbors" from
this general prohibition were inserted in section 253. The first safe
harbor, in subsection (b),"0 preserves state regulatory authority to im-
pose requirements regarding universal service, public safety and wel-
fare, and consumer protection, as long as they are competitively neu-
tral and consistent with section 254.11 The second safe harbor is
subsection (c), which protects two key functions of state and local gov-
ernments: managing the public rights-of-way, and obtaining compen-
sation for the use of local public rights-of-way. 12 In order to qualify
for the safe harbor under subsection (c), the Act requires that such
compensation be received on a competitively neutral and nondiscrimi-
natory basis, and that the compensation be publicly disclosed."
Congress removed these questions from the FCC's jurisdiction
in an effort to avoid "federalizing" local public rights-of-way, which
would have occurred if the FCC had been made the arbiter of whether
local management and compensation conditions fell within the section
253(c) safe harbor. 4 This is reflected in the language introducing sec-
tion 253(c) ("Nothing in this section affects . . ."), which is strongly
reminiscent of that introducing section 2(b) of the 1934 Act ("Nothing
in this act shall ... apply...").1 Congress similarly restricted the
FCC's authority to grant review in section 253(d). But unlike subsec-
tion 253(b), the subsection (c) safe harbor does not fall within the au-
thority given the FCC under subsection (d); thus, disputes under sub-
8. See, e.g., GOODALE, supra note 6, at § 1.16, pp. 1-37.
9. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a).
10. Id. § 253(b).
11. Id. § 254.
12. Id. § 253(c).
13. Id.
14. See infra Section IV.
15. Subsection (b) of section 2 ("Application of Act") was originally added on the floor of
the Senate to preserve prior existing nonfederal jurisdiction. This is the same "section 2(b)" that
the drafters of section 243(e) of House Bill 1555 (part of the "MFS amendment," discussed be-
low) had thought necessary to expressly override in their attempt to give the FCC jurisdiction
over such matters. Incidentally, the Supreme Court held this language to be an overriding denial
of jurisdiction to the Commission. See La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 370, 374
(1986) (section 2(b) defines limits of FCC's power to act and hence determines whether Congress
intended to displace state law).
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section (c) are, by deliberate decision of Congress, to be settled in the
courts.
B. The Importance of Maintaining Local Authority Has Increased Since
1996
The above outline of section 253 makes clear that in 1996 Con-
gress intended to preserve local authority over local public rights-of-
way. Since September 2001, the importance of that authority has in-
creased due to the heightened awareness of the role communications
plays in response to a variety of emergency situations. Communica-
tions systems serving a given area need to be able to survive both
natural disasters and deliberate attacks. This is especially true of the
systems that we rely on for public safety-primarily wireless mobile
communications systems used by law-enforcement and rescue person-
nel, but also the systems that governments use to communicate with
each other, their citizens, and key organizations such as rescue squads
and hospitals. As has frequently been noted, such survivability re-
quires both interoperability and redundancy. 6 Systems need to be
able to both intercommunicate transparently and to operate independ-
ently. If a Verizon switch in New York City is out of action, for ex-
ample, communications can be rerouted through other lines and con-
trol points. As FCC Media Bureau Chief W. Kenneth Ferree pointed
out:
We can no longer rely on a one-wire world ... 9/11 was not
only a terrible human loss but the outages and domino effect
from the collapse highlighted the importance of robustness and
the need for redundancies in our communication infrastruc-
ture.17
The role of local communities in providing for this interoperabil-
ity and redundancy is to address needs that private parties alone may
not wholly fulfill. Left to themselves, private carriers have incentives
to move in the opposite direction. A provider that wields market
power may believe that it benefits from keeping its users in a "walled
garden" and making it difficult for them to communicate with, or
through, its competitors.' 8 At the same time, a commercial provider,
16. See, e.g., Elizabeth V. Mooney, Spectrum: The Problem and Solution for Emergency
Communications, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, Oct. 21, 2002, available at 2002 WL 10371857.
17. W. Kenneth Ferree, Digital Connections: Creating a World Without Boundaries, Re-
marks at the Meeting of the National Association of Minorities in Cable (Sept. 24, 2002) (tran-
script available at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/namic.pd).
18. For example, it was only following a federal antitrust inquiry into its instant messaging
technology that America Online submitted a proposal allowing open access to its Instant Mes-
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on economic grounds alone, may also find it expedient to use parts of
other providers' plants rather than building redundant facilities of its
own, engaging in resale rather than facilities-based competition.
A local government may be able to take crucial steps to ensure
redundant paths are available by negotiating with carriers over place-
ment of facilities in the public rights-of-way, and balancing the effi-
ciencies of joint trenching against the potential bottleneck of having all
one's communications lines in one basket. Such detailed arrangements
as to where lines are run cannot be made by a central federal authority;
they are necessarily part of local right-of-way management. In con-
trast, many of the conditions for interoperability are likely to be best
addressed at the federal or state level, such as in the context of setting
technical standards that must be used by all providers for interconnec-
tion. But choosing actual locations for interconnection is the business
of local government, particularly where the local government may be
in the best position to provide a neutral meeting ground for competi-
tors to connect. In some cases, it may even be essential for a local
community to develop and own parts of the communications network
to ensure that coverage is complete and that all the necessary connec-
tions (whether or not sufficiently lucrative to attract private invest-
ment) are made.
It should be noted that the Internet itself, which was designed to
survive potential damage or attack, achieves survivability through a
decentralized model. There is no central location or "Internet capital"
controlling the entire system. Rather, the Internet functions through
cooperative functioning by peers, creating multiple redundant paths
that can automatically route around a problem. In a similar way, a ro-
bust national communications system can better be created by allow-
ing appropriate responsibilities at each level-federal, state, and lo-
cal-than by attempting to impose a top-down order from
Washington alone.
Local communities have long performed signal services by re-
quiring cable operators to make arrangements that enable better public
safety response as part of their local franchise commitments. 9 In the
senger system. AOL May Open IM Access, CNN MONEY, June 15, 2000, available at
http://www.money.cnn.com/2000/06/15/news/aol. Prior to opening access, AOL had con-
trolled 90% of the IM market and only allowed its own registered customers to use its communi-
cations network. Id. In 2000, several other messaging systems providers submitted interopera-
bility proposals to the Internet Engineering Task Force in response to intense public criticism.
Id.
19. For example, many cable franchises require the cable operator to provide local govern-
ments with access to the Emergency Alert System to warn viewers of local emergencies. Some
such franchises also provide for "institutional networks" to connect, among other locations, po-
lice, fire, and emergency management centers.
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more complex and interlocking world of modern communications sys-
tems, localities can perform this service on a broader scale through
management of their public rights-of-way. Other right-of-way man-
agement functions may also turn out to be crucial in an emergency.
For example, the local government is the logical place to coordinate
maps that indicate exactly where communications lines are located-
and they can do so only if they retain the power to acquire consistent
GIS formatted maps from the providers.
II. WHAT IS AT STAKE: LOCAL COMMUNITIES' PROPERTY
RIGHTS
The fundamental fact about local communities' rights vis-a-vis
telecommunications companies is this: the public rights-of-way belong
to the community, and neither a private company nor the federal gov-
ernment can use that property without the owner's permission. It is
important to set forth these basic facts plainly, given the degree to
which they have been obscured by shoals of red herrings in the course
of the right-of-way debate. Thus, this section outlines the basic prop-
erty rights at stake in the controversy over section 253.
A. Local Communities Have a Property Interest in the Public Rights-of-
Way
Municipal corporations often own rights-of-way in fee. 2' Alter-
natively, they may own a right-of-way easement over property, with
the underlying fee being held by the adjacent property owner.2' While
the form of the property rights involved may vary from state to state,22
in almost every case the community remains responsible for the opera-
tional management of the rights-of-way. This involves both taking
care of the property by ensuring that it remains usable for its primary
purposes, and administering the use of that property by the various
interested parties who may gain benefits from that use.
Local governments exercise this authority on behalf of their citi-
zens. Under the American constitutional system, a government re-
20. See 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1451 (1999) ("the fee to a street may be vested in
the municipality"). See, e.g., People ex rel. Hill v. Eakin, 50 N.E.2d 474, 478 (Ill. 1943) ("The
fee in streets and alleys is vested in the local municipality in trust for all the citizens of the
State ....").
21. See 64 C.J.S., supra note 20, at § 1451 ("Under this rule, the public or the municipality
acquires only an easement."). See, e.g., Miller County v. Groves, 801 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1991) ("The public has an easement in land held for public streets and the government
holds title to such easement in trust for the public's use.").
22. See 64 C.J.S., supra note 20, at §§ 1451-1452 for a general discussion of the nature of
title and ownership in the streets.
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ceives its authority from the consent of the governed. Accordingly, no
matter what the form of ownership, a local government holds property
(such as the public rights-of-way) in trust for its people.23 When a
third party intrudes upon that property without permission, it is not
merely occupying an amorphous commons, as would a fisherman
dropping a line in a trackless ocean. Instead, a third-party intruder is
violating the property rights of each individual represented by the lo-
cal government.
A local community's property rights over its streets and roads are
distinct from the regulatory authority it may exercise as part of its
governmental powers. Thus, even where the federal government pre-
empts state or local regulation of services, this does not prevent the ex-
ercise of state or local proprietary powers. 24 On the contrary, the fed-
eral government cannot deprive a state of the power to control the
property within its own borders without infringing upon the state's
sovereignty.2" Similarly, a local community's right to obtain compen-
sation for the use and occupancy of its property is distinct from its
governmental power to tax, though the two are often confused (or de-
liberately conflated under the rubric of "revenue-raising measures").26
The fact that local governments exercise this proprietary author-
ity as trustees in some sense for the public does not prevent them from
obtaining fair compensation on behalf of their citizens. On the con-
trary, a trustee has a duty not to give away property it holds in trust.27
23. See, e.g., Erie Telecomms. v. Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580, 595 (W.D. Pa. 1987), affirmed on
other grounds, 853 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1988); Rheinberger v. Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 146 F.2d
680 (7th Cir. 1944); City of Colorado Springs v. Weiher, 129 P.2d 988 (Colo. 1942); Yellow Cab
Taxi Serv. v. City of Twin Falls, 190 P.2d 681 (Idaho 1948); Miller County v. Groves, 801
S.W.2d 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
24. See, e.g., California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 496-99 (1990) (affirming construction of
section 27 of the Federal Power Act to protect proprietary activities).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 4 (1997) (ownership of lands is an essen-
tial attribute of sovereignty); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) (federal govern-
ment's exercise of a power of municipal sovereignty over lands within a state would be "repug-
nant to the Constitution," id. at 224). See generally 10A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 30.39 (3d ed. rev. vol. 1990).
26. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. FCC, 118 F.3d 393, 397-98 (5th Cir.1997) ("Franchise fees
are not a tax, however, but essentially a form of rent: the price paid to rent use of public right-of-
ways."); City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893) (the fee paid to a municipal-
ity for the use of its rights-of-way is rent, not a tax).
27. Black defines "trustee" as "[o]ne who, having legal title to the property, holds it in trust
for the benefit of another and owes a fiduciary duty to that beneficiary." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1519 (7th ed. 1999). Bouvier similarly states: "The duties of trustees have been
said, in general terms, to be: 'to protect and preserve the trust property, and to see that it is em-
ployed solely for the benefit of the cestui que trust [beneficiary].'' II BOUVIER'S LAW
DICTIONARY 3336 (3d ed. 1914). "Trustees possess general power to lease trust property pro-
vided it be for the advantage and protection of the cestui que trust, and that the interests of the
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Specifically, a trustee is required to charge reasonable rent, and the
reasonableness of the rent is measured by the value of the property
and local custom. 28  Courts have pointed out that localities, acting to
protect citizens, have not just a right but also a duty to obtain fair
value for public property used by private corporations.29 This princi-
ple is further recognized in the anti-donation laws, which in many
states forbid public officials to give away public property to private
parties.
30
In analyzing section 253, it is important to keep in mind that the
fundamental power to charge a fee for use of the public rights-of-way
derives from property rights under state and local law, not from any
federal law. Despite the fact that cable franchise fees are provided for
in the federal Cable Act, the ultimate basis for those fees lies in the
fact that a cable operator is using a community's property. The same
is true of other such fees for other users of the public rights-of-way.
B. Local Communities Authorize Private Parties to Use the Public
Rights-of- Way Through Franchises
The principal means by which private entities are allowed to use
public property is the franchise.31 Historically, local and state gov-
ernments had the primary responsibility for managing the public
rights-of-way to serve the needs of pedestrians and vehicular traffic.32
When public utilities began to emplace permanent facilities in those
rights-of-way, communities required each utility to obtain a specific
authorization. Such an authorization was classified as a franchise be-
remaindermen and those entitled to the property after termination of the trust." 90 C.J.S. Trusts
§ 472 (2002).
28. "A trustee is required to charge a reasonable rental for property of the trust which has
been leased, and lease of trust property will be set aside where it is for a nominal rental. In de-
termining whether or not a rent is reasonable, regard is to be had to the character of the rental
spaces, the purposes of the trust, the local custom with respect to similar property, and all the
conditions attending the execution of the lease." 90 C.J.S., supra note 27, at § 478.
29. See, e.g., Erie Telecommunications, 659 F. Supp. at 595.
30. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 6 ("No tax shall be levied, or appropriation of
public money made, or public property transferred, nor shall the public credit be used, except for
a public purpose."). Cost-free grants to telephone companies were at times justified against these
statutes on the ground that the benefits received by the community from a company functioning
as a public utility could be considered sufficient to compensate the community fairly. See Com-
tec, Inc. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 710 P.2d 1004 (Alaska 1985) (telephone services through a util-
ity promotes access and conveniences and fulfills a need for reliability, and therefore is not an
unlawful use of public funds).
31. See, e.g., 12 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
34.07 (3d ed. rev. vol. 1995) ("In nearly every jurisdiction, with only a few exceptions, a grant to
a public service company of the right to use streets for [various purposes] is a franchise.").
32. See HENK BRANDS & EVAN T. LEO, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIERS 4 (Artech House 1999).
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cause it represented a special privilege not enjoyed by other right-of-
way users.3" Pedestrians and vehicular traffic, for example, do not
permanently occupy the streets, and their occupation is transitory, in
contrast to that of public utilities and similar entities, which install
their systems permanently in the rights-of-way.
To use and occupy the public rights-of-way, franchises have re-
ceived various treatment: from special privileges granted to private
parties to occupy what is ordinarily public property dedicated to tran-
sitory public uses, to "functions delegated to private individuals to be
performed for the furtherance of the public welfare and subject to
public control."34 In any case, a grant (either from the state or from
the locality) is necessary because "[n]o private person can take an-
other's property, even for a public use," except by virtue of a legisla-
tive grant from the entity with authority over the property.3" An en-
tity that places facilities in the public rights-of-way receives a special
benefit by means of a special grant of authority, for which it can be
expected to pay a special user fee.
Historically, however, such fees were often waived. In particular,
local and state governments sought to encourage communications pro-
viders, along with other utilities, to bring services to their citizens.3 6
These governments lacked the capital needed to fully exploit new
technologies themselves and instead offered franchises to entrepre-
neurs to build utilities.3 7 Even though local communities were im-
pacted by the direct and incidental costs of the roadwork involved, lo-
cal officials believed that the benefits of communications services were
worth it. For this reason, many early franchises were informal and un-
33. Black defines "franchise" as a special privilege that does not belong to citizens of a
country generally, conferred by a government on an individual or a corporation. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 668 (7th ed. 1999).
34. 12 MCQUILLIN, supra note 31, at § 34.01.
35. California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1888). See also Tulsa v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co. 75 F.2d 343, 350 (10th Cir. 1935) ("franchise is a special privilege con-
ferred by government upon individuals"); United States v. King County, 281 F. 686, 689 (9th
Cir. 1922) ("To the commonwealth here, as to the king of England, belongs the franchise of
every highway as a trustee for the public.").
36. See, e.g., Nicholas P. Miller, Local Government: The Silent Investor in Wireline Tele-
communications Networks, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT ROLES AND CHOICES ON THE
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY: TENANTS OR ARCHITECTS OF THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS FUTURE? 20, 22 (Public Technology, Inc. 1994).
37. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the
Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851, 898 (1996). See also Charles D. Cosson, You Say
You Want a Revolution? Fact and Fiction Regarding Broadband CMRS and Local Competition, 7
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 233, 246 (1999) (citing ELI W. CLEMENS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
UTILITIES 72-74 (1950); HERBERT B. DORAU, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC
UTILITY ECONOMICS 2-8, 12-22, 31-49 (1930); JOSEPH ASBURY JOYCE, A TREATISE ON
FRANCHISES 542-54 (1909)).
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sophisticated.3" Frequently, they also required little in the way of
compensation, though it should be noted that the deal often involved a
commitment to universal service and was made under the assumption
that rates would be regulated either by state or by local authorities.39
Because local governments wished to encourage these service provid-
ers to build telephone networks and similar infrastructure in their ju-
risdictions, many local governments imposed minimal fees.4" None-
theless, the principle of payment for use of property was not
abandoned: many early telephone companies paid a portion of their
proceeds to the government as a condition of a franchise.4'
The right to grant a franchise for the use of public property is an
attribute of a sovereign entity, derived from the property rights of the
public.42 A franchise establishes a particular type of relationship, dis-
tinct from those created by mere permits for work in the public rights-
of-way. Generally, a franchise not only provides the authorization to
occupy public property, but also specifies the general conditions that
apply to such occupancy. A franchise does not hand over unlimited
property rights to the recipient. Rather, users such as public utilities
and cable companies obtain a right to an easement-a nonpossessory
right to enter and use land that is in the possession of another.43 The
conditions imposed on such franchises may include: location and
depth of placement, provisions for traffic safety and disruption, insur-
ance for and indemnification to the local government for injuries to
persons or property, relocation of facilities for public improvements,
38. Such franchise authorities might grant a license "merely upon a company's application
therefor. The document would authorize the cable system to use local streets, rights of way,
easements, etc., for erecting poles and stringing wires, cable and conduits necessary for its opera-
tions." S. REP. No. 98-67, at 6 (1983).
39. See Jennifer L. Worstell, Section 253 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: A Perma-
nent Physical Appropriation of Private Property that Must be Justly Compensated, 50 FED. COMM.
L. J. 441, 446 (1998); Miller, supra note 36, at 22.
40. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. See generally Worstell, supra note 39, at 446;
Miller, supra note 36, at 22. Such initial agreements were sometimes perpetuated as "automatic
franchises" and required no more than a nominal fee.
41. See HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW 1058, 1070
(West Publishing Co. 1998).
42. See supra Section II.A.
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 1.2 (1998). See, e.g., United States v. Puget
Sound Power & Light Co., 147 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1944) (applying Washington law); Vill. of
Blaine v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, 121 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1963); Northeast Sacramento
County Sanitation Dist. v. Northridge Park County Water Dist. of Sacramento County, 247 Cal.
App. 2d 317 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); Dunmar Inv. Co. v. N. Natural Gas Co., 176 N.W.2d 4
(Neb. 1970); In re Gillen Place, 106 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1952). Also, many states impose specific
term limitations on the granting of a franchise so that there cannot be a franchise in perpetuity.
See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. XII, § 228 (thirty years); ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 9 (no law granting
irrevocably any privilege, franchise, or immunity shall be enacted).
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and provisions addressing the removal or abandonment in place of fa-
cilities, as well as compensation.
Throughout much of the history of communications franchising,
a single telephone company was given an exclusive right to provide
service using the public rights-of-way; all other companies were
barred from that privilege.44 This approach was based on an explicit
or implicit assumption that a telephone system was a natural monop-
oly--only one provider could survive. This assumption was reversed
in the 1996 Act, which assumed that it was economically viable for
multiple providers to coexist and took steps (including section 253) to
encourage such competition. Thus, franchises under the Act must be
assumed to be nonexclusive.
C. Local Communities Should Charge Market Value for Use of the
Public Rights-of- Way by Private Parties
As the owner/trustee of the public rights-of-way, a local gov-
ernment has property rights on par with those of a private property
owner. Nonetheless, considerable controversy has developed because
of an assumed tension between these local property rights and the in-
terest in promoting competitive entry reflected in section 253. Three
primary issues appear to be in play at this time with respect to local
communities' property rights:
(1) Management. It is generally agreed that local governments
are responsible for making sure that the numerous communica-
tions systems (as well as other facilities) in the public rights-of-
way can smoothly coexist. No other candidates are apparent to
take over this crucial function. At the same time, of course, no
one user of the rights-of-way wishes to have its own operations
restricted in any way. Thus, while consensus on this point exists
in theory, disagreements abound in practice.
(2) Compensation. Neither those who wish to use local commu-
nities' property for free, nor decision makers at the federal level,
are eager to recognize local communities' right to receive com-
pensation for the use of their property. There is a striking reluc-
tance to admit that under normal free market principles tele-
communications companies that receive value from use of the
public rights-of-way owe compensation to the owners.
(3) Control. As a general matter, property owners enforce their
rights to both (1) manage their property, and (2) receive fair
44. See BRANDS & LEO, supra note 32, at 4.
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compensation by exercising the right to control who has access
to that property. A landlord can obtain rent for a property be-
cause a potential user has to get the landlord's permission to en-
ter and occupy the property. To some, however, the exercise of
this control looks like a "barrier to entry" in section 253's sense:
it could prevent a potential competitor (one who refused to pay
fair compensation) from gaining access to the public rights-of-
way so as to provide a service. Many of the section 253 cases
turn on the recharacterization of a basic element of property
rights-the right to exclude-as a regulatory barrier of the sort
section 253 was created to preempt.
45
Industry parties in litigation are generally unwilling to concede
that fair market compensation can be required. They take the position
that they do not oppose legitimate management of the public rights-
of-way (although they disagree as to what sorts of requirements fall
within the category of legitimate management). The control factor
above is basically ancillary to the other two-one enforces one's prop-
erty rights, where necessary, by controlling access to the property-
and so will generally be considered subsumed in compensation and
management (although the way in which control is exercised often
seems to make a difference to a court reviewing right-of-way require-
ments). The core of the controversy has to do with compensation,
which will be the primary focus in analyzing section 253 cases.
The following sections show why local communities not only
can, but should, charge a fair market price for the use of the public
rights-of-way.
1. Local Communities Are Entitled to Recover the Fair Market Value
of Locally Owned Land
As a general matter, local right-of-way franchises grant private
parties, such as communications companies, three distinct and valu-
able rights of use: (a) the option to place facilities throughout the pub-
lic rights-of-way, and thus to burden those rights-of-way; (b) the right
to create actual burdens on the public rights-of-way through the con-
struction work to install and maintain such facilities, and the continu-
ing occupation of limited space in the streets; and, (c) the ability to use
the public rights-of-way in doing business.
In a free market, a property owner has a right to charge a fair
market price in exchange for such rights of use. One reasonable
method for determining price might involve three kinds of compensa-
tion, corresponding to those three valuable rights: (1) an annual option
45. See infra Section V.
Seattle University Law Review
payment, probably in a fixed sum, reflecting the general potential
burden imposed on the community's property by the private user's
rights; (2) a payment related to the extent of the usage, probably based
on a linear foot calculation or similar occupancy measure, reflecting
the actual burden imposed; and (3) fair market value for the benefit
derived by the private user from use of the public rights-of-way,
probably in the form of a payment based on gross revenues, which re-
flects the value realized by the user from use of the community's prop-
erty.
In actual practice, governments at all levels have sought to realize
the benefits of ownership of public land through a variety of arrange-
ments. For example, the state of Alaska charges a 12.5% royalty on
crude oil pumped from state-owned lands.4" Revenues from this state-
owned asset fund state operations, making personal income taxes un-
necessary in Alaska.47 Some of these revenues are contributed to a
"Permanent Fund" against the day when the oil supply is exhausted.48
The federal government's spectrum auction policies, discussed below,
form another example.
State and local authority to exact reasonable "rental" compensa-
tion from private commercial entities who operate on local public
property for private economic gain is unambiguous, and it is not lim-
ited to the exploitation of mineral rights. In fact, public officials are
under an affirmative duty to obtain fair market value compensation
when disposing of valuable public property.49 More specifically, a
municipality cannot give away or grant for nominal or inadequate con-
sideration a franchise for the use of its streets.50 This is, of course, a
special case of the anti-donation principle referred to previously in
Section II.A.
One turn-of-the-century case construing the applicability of a
federal law to a telegraph company's use of local public property
framed the issue explicitly in terms of the parity of proprietary rights
in private and public property:
46. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.134 (2001).
47. Id. at § 36.10.005(a)(17).
48. ALASKA CONST. art. 9, § 15 (2001); ALASKA STAT. § 37,13.010 (2001).
49. See, e.g., Heiner v. City of Mesa, 515 P.2d 355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); Tedder v.
Walker, 89 S.E. 840 (Ga. 1916); Watson v. City of East Point, 154 S.E.2d 15 (Ga. 1967); Hack-
ett v. Trustees of Sch., 74 N.E.2d 869 (Ill. 1947); Club Jolliet, Inc. v. Manchester, 262 A.2d 844
(N.H. 1970); Ward v. City of Roswell, 281 P. 28 (N.M. 1929); Baler v. City of St. Albans, 39
S.E.2d 145 (W. Va. 1946).
50. See People ex rel. Lapice v. Wolper, 183 N.E. 451 (Ill. 1932); Daly v. Georgia, S. &
F.R. Co., 7 S.E. 146 (Ga. 1888); Clarke v. Evansville Boat Club, 88 N.E. 100 (Ind. App. 1909).
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The Congress of the United States has no power to take private
property for public purposes without compensation, and it can
no more take the property of a state or one of its municipalities
than the property of an individual. The acts of Congress ...
conferred on the defendant [telecommunications company] no
right to use the streets and alleys of the city ... which belonged
to the municipality.5'
2. Local Communities Incur Sizable Costs Due to Communications
Use of the Public Rights-of-Way
The preceding discussion bases a local community's right to fair
compensation on its rights as a property owner, irrespective of the
costs it may incur. It is also instructive, however, to note that tele-
communications companies' use of the public rights-of-way imposes
substantial costs on the community. Compensation requirements
provide a means of recovering those costs, although (just as in any
other property context) fair compensation is not confined to cost recov-
ery.
The American Public Works Association (APWA) has assem-
bled a great deal of information about the costs and effects of work in
the public rights-of-way by telecommunications companies. An
online article by Timothy X. Sullivan summarizes the results of a
number of studies in this area collected by AWPA in August 1997.52
51. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 76 S.W. 159, 160 (Ky. 1903). See also W.
Union Tel. Co. v. City of Richmond, 224 U.S. 160 (1912); St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148
U.S. 92 (1893); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919).
The one exception to the authority of state and local governments to obtain fair market value
for the use of their publicly owned property proves the rule. The Tonnage Clause of the Consti-
tution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, has been construed to prohibit "all taxes and duties regard-
less of their name or form ... which operate to impose a charge for the privilege of entering,
trading in, or lying in a port." Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261-66 (1935). This
provision was added to the Constitution in part, according to the Supreme Court, because the
Framers had "doubts whether the commerce clause would accomplish that purpose." Id. at 265.
Owing to this constitutional impediment, in this one context states are limited to the recovery of
costs associated with servicing vessels and policing their ports. Outside of that limited context,
however, states have far greater discretion to require compensation for the use of public property.
52. Timothy X. Sullivan, Accommodating New Telecommunications Providers in Public
Rights-of-Way: A View from City Hall, Municipal Research & Services Center available at
http://www.mrsc.org/legal/telecomm/sullivan.htm (under the heading, "Preserving the Integ-
rity and Useful Working Life of Public Rights-of-Way") (last visited March 5, 2003). Here,
Sullivan refers primarily to AM. PUB. WORKS ASS'N, MANAGING UTILITY CUTS (1997) (avail-
able for purchase at http://www.pubworks.org/bookstore), updated in Walaa E.I. Khogali & El
Hussein Mohamed, Managing Utility Cuts: Issues and Considerations, APWA Int'l Pub. Works
Congress, NRCC/CCWA Seminar Series "Innovations in Urban Infrastructure" (1999), at
http://www.nrc.ca/irc/fulltext/nrcc43713.pdf. He also cites CINCINNATI INFRASTRUCTURE
INST., DEPT. OF CIVIL & ENVTL. ENG'G, IMPACT OF UTILITY CUTS ON PERFORMANCE OF
STREET PAVEMENTS (Univ. of Cincinnati 1995); AM. ASS'N OF STATE HIGHWAY & TRANS.,
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The APWA compilation notes some of the interests communities
have in the public rights-of-way, including traffic safety and conven-
ience, and the need to preserve the public's investment in right-of-way
improvements. In addition, it identifies some of the problems that can
occur if communities do not effectively manage activity in the public
rights-of-way, including:
* "Excavations made without notice to the community"53
* "Excavations and restorations carried out in violation of
community standards" 4
* "Use of improper materials and methods in restoring
utility cuts''
55
* "Slow repairs that inconvenience the traveling public"56
* "Poor workmanship in trench reinstatement and pave-
ment restoration"
5 7
* "Public dissatisfaction with traffic delays and interrupted
utility service"58
* "Disruption of adjoining public facilities such as gutters
and sidewalks"5 9
* "Damage to adjoining utility facilities disturbed by im-
" 160proper excavation
* "Increased maintenance costs from pavements repeatedly
cut to access utilities
' 61
* "Increased danger for the public and the excavators.
62
Local communities are particularly concerned with the financial
impact when companies repeatedly cut into road surfaces, given the
current pressures on budgets for road maintenance and improvement.
For example, Santa Monica, California, found that the average life of
street pavement was reduced by sixty-four percent due to utility work,
resulting in an average cost of over $190,000 for patching alone.63 San
Francisco determined similarly that the pavement aging process was
significantly accelerated by increased levels of utility work. "Streets
GUIDE FOR ACCOMMODATING UTILITIES WITHIN HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY (1994) (avail-
able for purchase at http://www.transportation.org/aashto/home.nsf/FrontPage).
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with three to nine utility cuts are expected to require resurfacing every
eighteen years," representing a thirty percent reduction in service life
when compared to streets with fewer than three cuts.64
Altogether, these costs involve far more than the direct costs of
overseeing public right-of-way construction (for example, costs associ-
ated with permitting and inspecting), coordinating public right-of-way
construction (police supervision and traffic control), and responding to
construction-related complaints. Construction reduces the roadway
life,65 reduces space available in the roadway to others, makes coordi-
nation of public projects more difficult (and expensive), and often de-
lays detection of damage to vital utility infrastructure. Moreover, con-
struction imposes significant costs on the public. In some cases, those
costs are as simple (and as significant) as those associated with traffic
delays and vehicle damage.66 In other cases, critical access routes to
local businesses may be cut off, water lines broken, gas lines punc-
tured, and existing communication services disrupted. 7 The Univer-
sity of Minnesota, among others, has concluded that utility infrastruc-
ture installation imposes substantial costs on the public.6"
64. Ghassan Tarakji, San Francisco State University, The Effect of Utility Cuts on the Ser-
vice Life of Pavements in San Francisco, Volume 1: Study Procedure and Findings 6 (1995).
65. See, e.g., Tarakji, supra note 64; INFRASTRUCTURE MGMT. SERVS., INC.,
ESTIMATED PAVEMENT CUT SURCHARGE FEES FOR THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA
ARTERIAL HIGHWAY AND LOCAL STREETS (1994).
66. See, e.g., Lyndsey Layton, Hidden Cost of Road Tear-ups: D.C. Taxpayers Stuck With
Billfor Trench-Weakened Streets, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2000, at Al.
67. See, e.g., Lyndsey Layton, Despite Promises, Road Work Still Chaotic, Only I Cut Co-
ordinated Out of 507 Permitted, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2000, at Cl; Lyndsey Layton, Mayor
Vows to Bring Order to Street Work: Longer Moratorium on Trenches Is Possible, WASH. POST,
Mar. 28, 2000, at B1; Joanna Glasner, High Bandwidth Bureaucracy, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 25,
1999, available at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,18681,00.html; Rachel Hor-
ton, City Urges Conservation After Water Line Slashed, IRVING NEWS, July 1 -14, 1999, at 1A;
Rani Cher Monson & Melissa Borden, 3,600 Lose Emergency Phone Service, ARLINGTON
MORNING NEWS, July 16, 1999, at 1A; Stephen C. Fehr, Road Kill on the Information Highway,
WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1999, at Al; Jim Hannah & Cindy Schroeder, Fiber-Optic Cut Disrupts
Business Computers Snarled in Kenton County, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 28, 2001; Blake
Morrison & Amy Mayron, Buried Stone May Have Caused Break Submerged Block Diverted Au-
ger to the Side, Piercing Gas Line, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 13, 1998, at 1A.
68. Raymond L. Sterling, Indirect Costs of Utility Placement and Repair Beneath Streets,
Report to the Minnesota Department of Transportation (1994). These costs have been described
by local communities in comments at the FCC. See Comments of the Alliance of Local Organi-
zations Against Preemption, In Re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over
Cable and Other Facilities (GN Docket No. 00-18S), Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for
Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities (CS Docket No. 02-52), filed June 17,
2002. The members of this coalition include the National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference
of Mayors, the International Municipal Lawyers Association, the National Association of Coun-
ties, and the National Association of Telecommunications Officers and Advisors.
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3. The Value of the Public Rights-of-Way Is Not Confined to Costs
As noted in Section II.C., local communities' rights to
compensation are not solely based on the disruption that occurs when
a communications company installs facilities in the public rights-of-
way. In a free market, an owner generally bases a portion of the
charges to the property on how valuable that property is to the user.
Both facilities-based and non-facilities-based wireline communications
service providers use the public rights-of-way, directly or indirectly, to
transmit signals and provide service. Because the use has value to
these service providers, it is reasonable to expect them to pay a fair
price for the privilege.
Revenues generated from that use are one measure of how valu-
able a company finds the community's asset, and some right-of-way
franchises base compensation on the gross revenues derived from that
use.69 Another way of estimating value might be to look at the value
of the private property abutting a right-of-way and consider what it
would cost a company to acquire the necessary rights to use that alter-
nate route. Either way, it is clear that a potential right-of-way user
gains a significant advantage by dealing only with one lessor: the local
government. This "one-stop shopping" approach enables the user to
avoid the transaction costs that would otherwise be involved in strik-
ing numerous deals with numerous individual property owners.
Examination of analogous transactions and prices is another way
of gauging the reasonableness of a value for the public rights-of-way.
A useful reference point for speaking of public assets of any kind may
be the 12.5% royalty on Alaska North Slope oil previously men-
tioned.7" A similar type of transaction is leasing retail space in shop-
ping malls (representing "space rental," though most frequently in the
private rather than the public sector), where the lessee commonly pays
the lessor fifteen percent of gross revenues for the use of that space."
At first, cable franchising may seem more analogous to commu-
nications use of the public rights-of-way because of the five percent
cap the Cable Act places on gross revenues in the form of a franchise
69. Compare cable franchise fees, which are generally based on gross revenues. See 47
U.S.C. § 542(b) (2002).
70. See supra note 46.
71. See 1 M.R. FRIEDMAN, LEASES § 6.1, at 158-59 (2d ed. 1983) ([A] percentage lease
"gives [the] landlord an opportunity to share in [the] tenant's success without being saddled with
long-term low rental agreements. In leases of shopping center stores its use is virtually universal.
In other retail establishments its use is hardly less."); In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 13:38-1.3(o by
the State Bd. of Optometrists, 775 A.2d 629, 635 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) ("A percent-
age lease is an efficient device for figuring the actual value of rented space..."); Note, The Per-
centage Lease-Its Functions and Drafting Problems, 61 HARV. L. REV. 317, 318-20 (1948).
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fee.12 However, since the Cable Act also allows local communities to
require benefits in a cable franchise over and above the franchise fee,
this five percent cap does not in fact limit the total compensation that
may be received from a cable operator when both franchise fees and
in-kind benefits are taken into account. Thus, the cable compensation
level is actually closer to the other analogues mentioned here than may
seem at first to be the case.
More than fifty class actions have been filed alleging that local
property owners' rights were violated when telecommunications com-
panies obtained access, without permission, from the owners of the
land under or adjacent to railroad rights-of-way. 73  These cases use-
fully illustrate the real value of these rights-of-way. In Indiana, for
example, AT&T agreed to pay $3.6 million to landowners for laying
fiber in abandoned PennCentral rights-of-way, equivalent to $45,000
per linear mile for eighty miles, plus costs and attorneys' fees. 74 In an-
other pending Indiana case, State Court Judge William Hughes, call-
ing MCI Worldcom's actions a "willful trespass," awarded plaintiff a
temporary injunction, and ordered the company to "remove all
equipment and supplies." 5 MCI WorldCom placed the cost of the
injunction at $30,000 to $60,000 per fiber per month-at least $8 mil-
lion per month.76
The federal government, when acting through agencies tasked
with managing public assets, has also commanded market prices for
communications uses of public property. For example,
[t]he National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
[NOAA], which is required by law to charge market rates for
use of federal lands it controls, estimates that the telecommuni-
cations boom sent the price for using 5 or more miles of contigu-
72. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b).
73. Mark Allan Calhoun, The Price of Progress: Defending Lawsuits Brought Against Rail-
roads and Telecommunications Companies Who Contract to Allow Installation of Fiber Optic Cable
in Railroad Rights-of- Way, Law Seminar International's Fourth Annual Local Telecommunica-
tions Infrastructure (Aug. 23-24, 2001).
74. AT&T Settles Class Action Alleging Trespass, 1 TELECOM LAND MGMT. LAW REP.
no. 7, at 11-12 (May 1999).
75. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Peeler v. MCI WorldCom Network
Serv., Inc., No. 29D03-0106-MI-448, 13 (Hamilton Sup. Ct., Ind.) (filed June 28, 2001),
available at http://www.ackersonlaw.com/peelerorder.010628.pdf.
76. Press Release, The Ackerson Group, MCI WorldCom Claims Losses of Eight Million
Per Month From Fiber Build Injunction (July 6, 2001) available at http://www.ackersonlaw
.com/010706.worldcom.pdf.
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ous right of way soaring from around $8,000 per mile in 1987 to
over $100,000 in 1997.77
In mid-2002, NOAA applied a fair market value approach for
installation of fiber in National Marine Sanctuaries, citing comparable
transactions at $40,000 to $100,000 per mile of fiber (declining to
adopt a more aggressive $240,000-per-mile methodology used by the
California State Land Commission).7 8
The federal government's spectrum auction policy is a particu-
larly interesting example of the right and duty to obtain fair value for
public assets. When spectrum was originally designated for radio and
television broadcast applications in the early twentieth century, the
"airwaves" were treated as national public property, but specific com-
pensation was not demanded from the users. Only a somewhat vague
and further attenuated obligation to operate "in the public interest"
was placed on these broadcasters.79 In more recent years, however, the
FCC has taken to using auctions of spectrum allocations as a way to
obtain fair value from their users. Potential users bid on specified al-
locations, based on the value they expect to realize, and the FCC
awards the allocation based on those bids."°
The auction method has generally been endorsed by the federal
government as a means of realizing appropriate compensation for the
use of public assets. A 2001 FCC study, for example, noted that one
of the goals of spectrum assignment is "revenue for the public," and
reported that as of that period "[t]he 32 auctions conducted by the
FCC have raised over $32 billion for the U.S. Treasury."" The
Commission noted that such auctions serve sound economic policy
purposes:
77. Christopher Conte, The Great Broadband Heist, GOVERNING, Aug. 2002, at 34, avail-
able at http://governing.com/8broad.htm.
78. COMMUNICATIONS DAILY (Warren Communications News Subscriber Service,
Washington, D.C.), Aug. 29, 2002, at 8.
79. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943) ("The criterion governing the
Commission's licensing power is the 'public interest, convenience, or necessity."), citing 47
U.S.C. §§ 307(a)(d), 309(a), 310, 312 (1934); FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940)
(the public interest is a criterion "as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a
field of delegated authority permit").
80. See In re Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act-Competitive
Bidding, 9 F.C.C.R. 2348 (1994), on recons., Second Memorandum Opinion and Order In re Im-
plementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bidding, 9 F.C.C.R.
7245 (1994), amended by, Amendment of Part I of the Commission's Rules-Competitive Bid-
ding Proceeding, WT Docket No. 97-82, Order, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice
of Proposed Rule Making, F.C.C. 97-60 (rel. Feb. 28, 1997) (Part I Order).
81. Evan Kwerel & Walt Strack, FCC, Auctioning Spectrum Rights 3 (Feb. 20, 2001), at
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/papersAndStudies/aucspec.pdf.
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Our experience has been that auctions are superior to the alter-
natives because they are more likely to award licenses fairly and
efficiently. Auctions assign licenses quickly to those who value
them the most, employ objective, transparent criteria, reduce
wasteful private expenditures on obtaining licenses, and raise
revenue for the public.82
In a 1997 report to Congress, the FCC declared as follows: "The
Commission's auctions program has demonstrated the ability to award
licenses to productive users, to encourage the emergence of innovative
firms and technologies, to generate valuable market information, and
to raise revenues for the public."83 Congress's view is that the FCC is
not only permitted, but also expected, to gain fair value for the air-
waves as a federal asset.84
Just as private property owners are permitted to require users of
their property to pay fair market value for that use, users of govern-
ment property are also required to pay a fair price. In this context, the
only mystery is why objections are raised to this broad principle when
it is applied to local communities' public rights-of-way. This anomaly
frequently arises when a court or a commentator fails to recognize the
property interest involved and insists on regarding right-of-way au-
thority solely as "regulation."8"
4. Sound Economic Policy Supports Allowing Local Communities to
Charge Fair Market Value for Property Used
The preceding discussion explains how allowing business entities
to use a valuable asset without fully compensating the owners would
be unjust and contrary to law. It would also be bad economic policy.
From the standpoint of economic efficiency, it is incorrect to
suggest that charging compensation that represents the value of the
82. Id. at 1.
83. FCC, Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions 2, F.C.C. 97-353 (1997), available at
1997 WL 629251.
84. In response to reports that a settlement with a wireless carrier might result in less than
full payment of auction amounts, Senator John McCain was quoted as objecting in October
2001:
"The expected $17 billion.., in receipts from January's re-auction would have pro-
vided revenue desperately needed to address the recent terrorist attacks upon this
country, and I am disturbed that an American company would force American tax-
payers to forgo some of that money by exploiting legal technicalities," he added. "But
if this does happen, then this Congress must use its oversight authority to ensure that
this matter is resolved upon terms that protect the American people from being short-
changed once again."
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS DAILY (www.tr.com Subscriber News Service), Oct. 26,
2001.
85. See infra Section V.
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property used is somehow a barrier to entry. In a free-market econ-
omy, market entrants in every industry are normally expected to pay
fair market value for the property they use. If some resources are sold
at artificially low prices, this subsidy tends to distort the market by at-
tracting investment to alternatives (e.g., types of telecommunications
networks) that actually cost more than their apparent price would in-
dicate. The result is a misallocation of resources. Cost-free or drasti-
cally below-market availability of resources8 6 distorts normal market
incentives and tends to lead to inefficient allocation of economic re-
sources. 87 For example, the incentives to invest in satellite delivery
systems as opposed to wireline systems will be skewed if the former
require spectrum to be paid for at auction, but the latter can take ad-
vantage of (local) public rights-of-way for free.
In other contexts, the FCC has long recognized that requiring
communications companies to pay fair market value for the inputs
used in their business encourages competition and economic deploy-
ment of resources. For example, the Commission's spectrum auction
generated huge revenues for the Treasury, but the effect was to en-
courage competition and deployment rather than discourage it.88 The
Commission concluded:
[T]he competitive bidding process provides incentives for licen-
sees of spectrum to compete vigorously with existing services,
develop innovative technologies, and provide improved products
to realize expected earnings. In this way, awarding spectrum us-
ing competitive bidding aligns the licensees' interests with the
public interest in efficient utilization of the spectrum. As one
commenter observes, "Successful bidders are those that not only
place a high value on the property relative to other auction par-
86. Generally industry advocates assert that they are not demanding free use of the public
rights-of-way because they are willing to pay the administrative costs of managing the right-of-
way use-in effect, the cost of issuing permits. Since these administrative costs will in almost all
cases be far below market value, this qualification is trivial. For simplicity's sake, the discussion
herein does not distinguish between the position that localities must allow use of their rights-of-
way for free, and the position that they must allow such use at a nominal administrative cost.
87. "Classical economic theory holds that subsidies distort the market outcome that would
have occurred absent the subsidy, thereby creating inefficiencies in resource allocation which
lower global welfare." Robert H. Lantz, The Search for Consistency: Treatment of Nonmarket
Economies in Transition Under United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 10 AM.
U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 993, 1009 (Spring 1995) (citing Jeffrey E. Garten, New Challenges in the
World Economy: The Antidumping Law and U.S. Trade Policy, Remarks Before the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 7, 1994) (quoting JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI,
PROTECTIONISM (1988)).
88. See supra Section I.C.3.
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ticipants, but also have the financial capability to support their
bids. "89
The same is true with respect to charging for use of public
rights-of-way. Allowing communities to charge fair market value will
not discourage use of the public rights-of-way if an enterprise is
sound, but it will discourage uneconomic uses.9" Charging a fair price
for the use of rights-of-way will help companies make more rational
investment decisions.
In other words, forcing local communities to give away access to
their property at below-market rates would be the same as forcing
them to subsidize the telecommunications companies that use the
rights-of-way.91  Charging market-level fees for use of the public
rights-of-way prevents what would otherwise be substantial subsidies
running from the public to communications providers. Unless local
governments, as trustees of the public rights-of-way, can charge a fair
market rent for cable operators' use and occupancy of the public
rights-of-way, a direct subsidy will run from consumers to the indus-
try. There is no good reason for citizens to pay such a subsidy in favor
of telecommunications companies and their customers.
These points must be kept clearly in mind when dealing with the
frequently repeated claim that giving away communities' property is
necessary to promote the development of broadband communications.
It is not at all clear that federal subsidies are the best way to promote
such development. More importantly, if the federal government did
wish to subsidize broadband carriers, candor and accountability re-
quire that it do so through explicit, deliberate, and temporary appro-
priations. Otherwise, reading section 253 to require cost-free use of
local communities' property by private businesses would result in
permanent, covert subsidies using other people's money.
89. See FCC, Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions, supra note 83, at 18.
90. Indeed, the recent problems in the broadband industry generally have been exacerbated
by overinvestment. The last thing the industry needs is a further incentive to misallocate re-
sources. See, e.g., Brian Leaf, Battling Waves of Woe: Once High-Flying Industry Getting
Swamped, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., Feb. 25, 2002 ("As companies rushed to install fiber optic ca-
bles-the autobahn of the new economy-they went overboard. Now, the capacity glut has cost
telecom companies billions of dollars, with no forseeable [sic] return on their investment.").
91. The companies, not their customers, are subsidized, because most such companies are
not required to pass through cost-savings to their customers. Old-time monopoly telephone
companies subject to rate-of-return regulation might have been required to pass through such
savings; contemporary competing providers are not.
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5. Reading Section 253 to Prevent Local Communities from Charging
Fair Market Value Would Result in an Unconstitutional Taking
The inviolability of state and local property rights against federal
depredation is reflected in the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on un-
justly compensated federal takings of state and local property.9 2 The
Fifth Amendment "encompass[es] the property of state and local gov-
ernments when it is condemned by the United States."93 As the Su-
preme Court pointed out in St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co.94 over
a century ago:
No matter how broad and comprehensive might be the terms in
which the franchise was granted [by the national government], it
would be confessedly subordinate to the right of the individual
not to be deprived of his property without just compensa-
tion .... This rule extends to streets and highways .... When an
appropriation of any part of this public property to an exclusive
use is sought, whether by a citizen or corporation of the same of
another state or a corporation of the national government, it is
within the competency of the state, representing the sovereignty
of that local public, to exact for its benefit compensation for this
exclusive appropriation. It matters not for what that exclusive
appropriation is taken, whether for steam railroads or street rail-
roads, telegraphs or telephones, the state may if it chooses exact
from the party or corporation given such exclusive use pecuniary
compensation to the general public for being deprived of the
common use of the portion thus appropriated .... [W]hile
permission to a telegraph company to occupy the streets is not
technically a lease and does not in terms create the relation of
landlord and tenant, yet it is the giving of exclusive use of real
estate, for which the giver has a right to exact compensation,
which is in the nature of rental.9"
For this reason federal law must be read to respect rather than to
violate local communities' property rights. As a general rule, statutes
are to be interpreted in such a way as not to raise constitutional prob-
lems.96 If section 253 can be read in a way that is consistent with local
92. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
93. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984).
94. Western Union, 148 U.S. 92 (1893).
95. Id. at 101-02, 99 (emphasis added). See also 50 Acres, 469 U.S. at 25; United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
96. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute
would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress"). See also I.N.S.
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341,
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property rights, courts should follow that reading, rather than create a
construction that would require a Fifth Amendment taking. Since
section 253 can indeed be read to preserve, rather than infringe, local
property rights,97 the statutory language should not be construed to
require communities to accept less than fair market value for the use of
their public rights-of-way.98
In sum, both fundamental fairness and sound economics militate
against the notion that local property could be given away to private
parties by section 253.99
D. The Principle of Federalism Is Implemented by Upholding Local
Property Rights
As shown above, local communities' authority over their public
rights-of-way is supported both by the Fifth Amendment and by the
common law of property. In the context of potential federal preemp-
tion, however, these local property rights also emerge as linked to a
central structural principle of our political and legal system. A reading
of section 253 that rides roughshod over local property rights would
undermine the basic principle of federalism.
In the preeminent case on federalism, M'Culloch v. Maryland,
the Supreme Court announced the doctrine of enumerated powers: the
federal government may exercise only the powers delegated to it in the
Constitution, and the states and the people reserve all powers not
enumerated as federal powers, or reasonably implied as part of such an
enumerated power."' Forty years later, the Court further explained
the fundamental notion of federalism: dual sovereignty." 1 State and
local governments are not mere creatures of the nation-state, whose
authority can be altered at will. Even as members of the federal union,
they retain the authority and the power to act independently of the
345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson
Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-08 (1909).
97. See supra Section I.A.
98. This approach would preserve a reasonable interpretation-in fact, as shown below, the
intended interpretation-of § 253, while avoiding the problems delineated by Jennifer L. Wor-
stell, supra note 39. Worstell concludes that § 253 does create a taking of local community prop-
erty and hence is unconstitutional. This Article, however, concludes that § 253 should instead be
read not to create such a taking.
99. This is even aside from the unfavorable precedent such a policy would create with re-
spect to private property in general.
100. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 384-88 (1819).
101. "The powers of the General Government, and of the State, although both exist and
are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting
separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres." Ableman v. Booth,
62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858).
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federal government, except where the Constitution must be read to
preempt them.
10 2
In particular, state and local governments remain the key players
in dealing with local affairs. The Supreme Court "has emphasized the
importance in a democratic society of preserving local control of local
matters."' 3 It is difficult to conceive of a matter more quintessentially
local than authority over a city's streets and roads. Even where some
aspects of the systems that inhabit local public rights-of-way are of na-
tional scope,0 4 those aspects that are addressed and preserved by sec-
tion 253(c)-management of and compensation for the rights-of-
way-have to do with property that is located in a particular place and
governed by historically local rules. In these matters, centralized fed-
eral authority is both impotent and out of place.
The independent sovereignty of the states creates an environ-
ment in which various solutions to a problem can be tried out in mul-
tiple "laboratories of democracy." Local communities can experiment
with different ways of meeting needs; they can observe the results of
these different methods and adopt those that seem promising. Just as
the free market, with a million independent decision makers, functions
economically better than a centralized command economy; just as the
Internet with its distributed processing is more robust and flexible
than a classic mainframe system; so too a society in which state and
local governments can direct their own affairs as much as possible will
be healthier and more efficient than one in which centralized federal
agencies seek to micromanage local affairs.
The overarching concept of federalism appears in several forms
in American law. The Tenth Amendment embodies a rule that the
historic police powers of the states cannot be preempted by the federal
government unless Congress enacts a law stating that preemption is a
102. Ultimately, federalism may be seen as a specific expression of the general principle of
subsidiarity, which has been discussed in a number of contexts over the last several hundred
years. Briefly, it may be stated as follows: "[L]arger associations should not assume functions
which can be performed efficiently by smaller associations." JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW
AND NATURAL RIGHTS 146-47 (Clarendon Press 1980). A recent formulation makes the con-
nection with political federalism clear: "[N]o unit of society should perform functions more ap-
propriately performed by a smaller entity. The neighborhood should not usurp the normal func-
tion of the family; the city the function of the neighborhood; the state the function of the city; or
the federal government the function of the state." Delivery of Social Services Through Faith-
Based Organizations, George Washington Univ. Inst. for Communitarian Pol'y Studies, 7,
available at http://www.gwu.edu/-icps/faithb.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). A more de-
tailed analysis of the principle of subsidiarity is beyond the scope of this Article.
103. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 201 n.12 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974)).
104. For example, the technical standards that allow for interconnection among communi-
cations systems.
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"clear and manifest purpose" of its act.' Similarly, "Congress may
not enact any law that would direct the functioning of the States' ex-
ecutives or legislatures.""1 6
This last point-preserving a realm of independence from federal
direction for state executives and legislatures-is also embodied in the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA).0 7 This Act for-
bids the federal government to attempt to commandeer local property
or local decision makers for federal purposes."0 8 In doing so, it also al-
locates financial responsibility: the federal government may not pursue
its purposes by overtly or covertly imposing the fiscal burdens of fed-
eral programs on state or local communities. 9
In this context, the prohibition against uncompensated takings,
when applied to state and local government property, as discussed in
Section II.C.5., becomes a further bulwark against federal trespasses
over the boundaries set by federalism. The Fifth Amendment ensures
that Congress cannot deprive state and local governments of their in-
dependent power to act by depriving them of the resources necessary
to do so. Conversely, it ensures that the federal government cannot
force state and local governments to bear the burden of federal pro-
grams through seizure of state and local property. By protecting the
independent property base of state and local communities, the Tak-
ings Clause helps make sure that the sovereign freedom of action re-
served to the states is not merely theoretical, but practical.
It is clear that prior to any consideration of the 1996 Act or sec-
tion 253, local communities had the right to manage and obtain com-
pensation for the public rights-of-way based on inviolable property
105. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Hillsborough County v.
Auto. Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1985); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
106. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 458 (4th Cir. 1998).
107. Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995)
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1501).
108. Id.
109. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (commandeering of public property in service of a fed-
eral regulatory program is no less offensive to the sovereignty of state government than the com-
mandeering of its legislative processes). As more fully discussed below, the UMRA was at issue
in the development of § 253 itself. Early versions of § 253 raised concerns that the provision
would be read to force communities to grant cost-free access to their property, depriving them of
reasonable compensation. Advocates for local communities pointed out that if it were read as
limiting compensation to costs, the bill that became the 1996 Act would have been subject to a
point of order under section 2(6) of the UMRA. The language that ultimately developed into §
253(c) was introduced specifically to avoid that problem-in the wider context, to ensure that the
1996 Act did not become a vehicle for commandeering local resources in the service of federal
purposes. Under § 253(c), it remains up to state and local governments how far they may wish to
subsidize telecommunications development by holding in abeyance their right to full compensa-
tion.
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rights and supported by the constitutional principle of federalism.
That includes the right to charge a fair market price for the use of the
public rights-of-way by communications providers. Local communi-
ties' right to authorize use of the public rights-of-way through fran-
chises flows from those underlying rights and represents a normal and
appropriate means for allowing private entities to use public property
in a fair and orderly fashion.
III. OPPONENTS OF LOCAL AUTHORITY CONFUSE PROPERTY
WITH REGULATION
A. Failure to Distinguish Property Rights from Regulation Leads to
Mischaracterizations
Section 253 has placed the use of local public rights-of-way in the
spotlight of telecommunications policy. Since the passage of the 1996
Act, the courts and the FCC have attempted to grapple with the
proper interpretation of this provision. However, the strong tendency
in both venues to characterize local property rights as regulatory re-
strictions has led to an unnecessary level of confusion and misinterpre-
tation in the developing law.
Local governments wear two hats: they are both regulators and
property owners. For this reason, it is easy to confuse the two func-
tions and interpret a property-based action as if it were a regulatory
action. For example, when one pays money to a government, the ten-
dency is to assume it is a tax, but that is not always the case. If one
buys a book from the Government Printing Office, one is engaging in
a commercial transaction, just as if one were buying from Barnes &
Noble. The payment for the book does not become a tax merely be-
cause it is paid to government. Similarly, if one rents retail space in a
building that happens to be owned by the government, the rent is not
a tax, because it is being paid in exchange for a specific economic
benefit, just as it would be to a private party. Similarly, conditions
imposed on the lessee by the government as a landlord are not regula-
tions when they correspond to the kinds of conditions any landlord
might impose on any lessee.
When an observer misunderstands the transaction at issue, he or
she is likely to mischaracterize compensation and other conditions.
Rents will be misidentified as taxes; lease terms will be misconstrued
as governmental regulations. It may even be to the advantage of an
observer to encourage this mischaracterization, because "tax" and
"regulation" tend to have negative connotations, and misdescribing
the transaction may gain one party a significant rhetorical advantage.
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Indeed, if different legal standards apply to taxes and to rent transac-
tions, then the mischaracterization may have substantive legal conse-
quences.
Confusion between property rights and regulation is widespread
in the debate over section 253. Many commentators, and many deci-
sion makers, tend to describe right-of-way transactions purely in regu-
latory terms, without acknowledging the role of property rights. This
way of looking at the matter makes market-level compensation look
like onerous taxes, and it makes lease conditions look like regulatory
red tape. It sees a local community's control of its public rights-of-
way as an issue of regulatory barriers to entry rather than of an owner's
right to control use of its property. There is a strong incentive for plain-
tiffs11 under section 253 to focus solely on regulation and to ignore
property rights. Judges are likely to look sympathetically on a plea to
eliminate regulatory barriers; they are less likely to approve a candid
demand to invade another party's property rights.
B. The FCC Has Confused Property Rights With Regulation
The "regulation" approach to rights-of-way is frequently ex-
pressed at the FCC. On the same day that Senator McCain was re-
ported as emphasizing the need to recover full value in spectrum auc-
tions,'' Commissioner Martin of the Commission was describing local
right-of-way conditions in terms of taxes and regulations: "We need
to change the way government taxes broadband services and [creates]
regulatory financial disincentives," he said."' He specifically singled
out state and local government burdens such as franchise fees, right-
of-way fees, and permitting processes. The Commissioner's web page
further stated:
At every level of government, we ought to work to remove regu-
latory underbrush-burdensome regulations that may be imped-
ing deployment. For competitive carriers, many of these hurdles
occur at the state and local levels. These include local rights of
way, permits for zoning and tower siting, and franchise fees that
I have already discussed."'
110. Typically, under § 253, plaintiffs are those who wish to avoid paying compensation or
complying with conditions for right-of-way use.
111. October 26, 2001. See TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS DAILY, supra note 84.
112. TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS DAILY (www.tr.com Subscriber News Service),
Oct. 26, 2001 (emphases added).
113. Commissioner Kevin J. Martin, Framework for Broadband Development: Remarks at
the National Summit on Broadband Deployment (Oct. 26, 2001), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/speeches/Martin/2001/spkjml0l.html (emphases added).
Seattle University Law Review
The same attitude infects FCC decisions in a variety of areas. In
a decision regarding cable franchise fees, the Commission called such
fees "a unique class of external costs." '114 Yet such franchise fees ap-
pear to be "unique" only on the assumption that they represent some
peculiar sort of governmental exaction. Given that they correspond
closely to rent for the use of the public rights-of-way, it is hard to see
where their "uniqueness" lies, or why they should be treated differ-
ently from other types of rent a cable operator pays. 115
The Commission's position on this issue has been systematically
inconsistent. When the Commission charges "rent" for radio fre-
quency spectrum, it is proud of the rents realized and does not regard
such a charge as taxation."' On the other hand, when local communi-
ties charge "rent" for their public rights-of-way, the Commission is
strongly suspicious of this as a potential barrier to entry.1 7 No reason
has yet been suggested why the federal spectrum resource should be
made available only at the best price bid, while local public right-of-
way resources should be given away at below-market prices. Nor has
the Commission taken the position that its own spectrum auctions
slow the development of competitive networks by requiring a fair
price. By its own practice and pronouncements, the Commission is
committed to the position that fair compensation for use of a resource
does not impede competition. Yet it has been reluctant to apply that
principle with respect to local public rights-of-way. This is the very
reverse of a federalist approach to the various levels of rights.1 It
would be inconsistent for the Commission to suppress local rights
while claiming those same rights for itself at the federal level.
C. Other Commentators Confuse Property Rights With Regulation
A number of recent articles fall victim to the same fallacy of re-
ducing property rights to regulation. This confusion is characteristi-
cally associated with the claim that compensation for use of the public
rights-of-way is limited by section 253 to the cost of administering
that use. For example, Christopher R. Day argued in May 2002 that
"Lack of Local Rights-of-Way Access Is Killing Competitive Local
114. Memorandum Opinion and Order In re Petitions for Declaratory Rulings on Fran-
chise Fee Pass Through Issues for the City of Pasadena, CSR-5441-R; City of Nashville, CSR-
5373; and City of Virginia Beach, CSR-5282-R, F.C.C. 01-289, 16 F.C.C.R. 18, 192 (Oct. 4,
2001), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/FCC-01-289Al .pdf.
115. Other types of rent may include: rent for office space, or for a building to accommo-
date a cable system headend.
116. See supra notes 81 and 82.
117. See infra Section V.B.1.
118. See supra Section II.D.
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Exchange Carriers."1 9 Day describes the exercise of local rights as "a
patchwork of local regulation governing rights-of-way access.' 12' He
refers to section 25 3(c) as creating "a limited 'safe harbor' for munici-
palities to regulate carefully defined rights-of-way management func-
tions. ' 121 In line with this point of view, Day fails to see the point of
the dispute over right-of-way compensation. He assumes that com-
pensation should be limited to costs, without ever discussing the mat-
ter-even though there is no reference at all to costs in the statutory
provision. 2 This approach, which is wholly implausible based on the
statute and legislative history itself, appears more plausible if one
makes the unstated assumption that only the costs of regulation need
to be considered, as distinct from the real market value of an asset. As
a result, outraged by the claims of local communities to compensation
over and above costs, Day criticizes the FCC for not taking strong
steps in section 253 matters to suppress local communities. 123 He
makes this criticism without noticing that section 2 53(d) removes sec-
tion 253(c) from the FCC's jurisdiction altogether, and thus renders
his proposed solution impossible.
124
Similarly, another May 2002 article by Qwest attorneys David
Goodnight and Roy Adkins focuses on regulation and makes a series
of unfounded assumptions about section 253.125 Goodnight and Ad-
kins castigate local communities for clinging to "comprehensive regu-
latory roles of a prior era."' 26 They do not address the importance of
localities' property rights. The article, presenting itself as an exposi-
tion of the Ninth Circuit's Auburn decision, 27 takes for granted that
'compensation" can only mean cost-without making an argument to
119. Christopher R. Day, The Concrete Barrier at the End of the Information Superhighway:
Why Lack of Local Rights-of- Way Access Is Killing Competitive Local Exchange Carriers, 54 FED.
COMM. L.J. 461 (2002).
120. Id. at 463 (emphasis added). The phrase "rights-of-way access" is itself indicative of a
point of view that ignores local property rights. If telecommunications industry problems were
attributed to the high prices charged by manufacturers of fiber-optic cable, it would still be
unlikely for an article on the problem to be headlined "Lack of Access to Fiber" and to propose
confiscation of the fiber without payment as a solution.
121. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 470.
123. Id. at 479.
124. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. A detailed rebuttal to Day's article may be
found in William Malone, Access to Local Rights-of-Way: A Rebuttal, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 101
(forthcoming 2003).
125. David Goodnight & Roy Adkins, The Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996: Section
253, Cooperative Federalism, and the Role of the Federal Courts, WASH. STATE BAR NEWS (May
2002), available at http://www.wsba.org/barnews/2002/O5/goodnight-adkins.htm.
126. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
127. City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 247 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
1079 (2002). See infra Section V.B.10.
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that effect, other than an invocation of the 1996 Act's pro-competitive
purposes under the heading "Effects of Gross-Receipts Fees on Com-
petition."' 121 Similarly, Goodnight and Adkins declare that fees based
on gross revenues "have no relationship to the use of the right-of-
way."''  Apparently this conclusion arises from the notion that new
services, and hence new revenues, may be added using existing facili-
ties without additional construction in the public rights-of-way. The
point is moot, however, once one realizes that the owner of an asset
may charge for its use based on the value the user derives from that
use-market value-not merely on the "impact costs" of the usage. 130
A similar bent may be found in an article by Barbara Esbin, a
senior FCC staff member who worked for several years for a Wash-
ington, D.C. law firm that represents cable companies, and Gary
Lutzker, a colleague from the same firm.' The primary focus of this
piece is on the open access debate, but the article includes a detailed
review of many section 253 cases. Like Day, Goodnight, and Adkins,
Esbin and Lutzker refer to local communities' interest in their public
rights-of-way primarily in terms of "regulation.', 3 2  Although they
briefly mention the notion of rent for local rights-of-way, 33 they
largely ignore property rights in their substantive discussion. Their
rejection of local communities' property rights is conclusory, and ap-
128. Goodnight & Adkins, supra note 125, at 6. Goodnight and Adkins claim later in the
piece that "cost-based fees are fair and reasonable" because "[e]ach carrier pays for actual costs
related to its use of the right-of-way." Id. at 8. This does not show, however, that non-cost-
based fees cannot also be fair and reasonable.
129. Id. at7. Seealsoid. at 9.
130. It is not clear whether the Goodnight and Adkins article addresses the "cooperative
federalism" referred to in the title. The term "federalism" occurs exactly once, in the first sen-
tence. The only role played by the concept of relations between federal and state or local gov-
ernments appears to be in the frequent, but ungrounded, assertion that "Congress carved out a
very limited, circumscribed role for local municipal government," a relationship that does not
prima facie appear to be very cooperative. Id. at 1.
131. Barbara S. Esbin & Gary S. Lutzker, Poles, Holes and Cable Open Access: Where the
Global Information Superhighway Meets the Local Right-of- Way, 10 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
23 (2001).
132. Id. at 27-29, 35 (quoting the FCC's Troy decision, cited infra note 143 and discussed
infra Section V.B.1.), 39 n.135, 41, 49, 77. Arguing against any requirement that a cable opera-
tor must obtain additional authority to use the public rights-of-way for non-cable purposes, Es-
bin & Lutzker tie local "regulation of telecommunications services" to the local interest in "man-
aging the rights -of- way"-invoking one of the local rights specifically preserved by § 253(c)
(management) without mentioning the other (compensation)-and, remarkably, conclude that
once right-of-way management is fully addressed, "no other interests remain to be addressed"
for local governments. Id. at 51-52.
133. Id. at 44-45.
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pears to be based on invoking "the pro-competitive policy goals of the
1996 Act." '134
This shifting of the ground of discussion is significant. If sup-
pressing local property rights is "the better view""1 ' because of a policy
goal of promoting facilities-based competition, then what Esbin and
Lutzker are saying is that local property rights may be overridden in
order to promote a federal goal: encouraging the construction of com-
munications systems. In effect, this is to say that local property
should be used to subsidize communications companies. While an
explicit subsidy in pursuit of federal policies, with compensation to
those whose property is taken, might be argued to be within the power
of the federal government, 136 this cannot be a reason to deny the exis-
tence of local property rights.
Esbin and Lutzker's treatment forms a useful illustration of the
inconsistency in industry treatment of property rights. For example,
the article touches on the "no additional burden" argument, 137 which
holds that there should be no additional compensation, as long as the
additional use of local community property does not impose additional
physical burdens on the public rights-of-way. 13' This argument, how-
ever, is never applied to industry property. It is not generally sug-
gested that cable modem service should be free to subscribers because
it traverses the same cable the company has already installed for other
purposes. 139 Nor, on the telephone side, is it commonly proposed that
DSL subscribers should not need to pay for that service because it
rides the same copper wires the telephone company has already put in
place. Rather, it is assumed that the owner can sell the use of its prop-
erty at a higher market price because the user is gaining greater value
from it through the new service. That same assumption is not ex-
134. Id. at 46. It is noteworthy that Esbin and Lutzker are far more sensitive when the
property rights of cable operators are in question. They suggest that a rule requiring cable
operators to allow other parties to transmit over their systems "effectively takes and physically
occupies significant portions of the operator's facilities" and thus raises constitutional concerns.
Id. at 78. Yet they are unconcerned about the constitutional ramifications of the direct physical
invasion of local public property by communications companies. (Indeed, the same kind of
transmission by a third party that is described as a "physical occupation" of a cable company's
system is dismissed, when it applies to local communities' property, as not even amounting to a
"use" of the property. See id. at 50-51 (emphasis added).)
135. Id. at 50-51.
136. As noted supra Section II.C.4.
137. Esbin & Lutzker, supra note 131, at 44.
138. See id. at 50 ("the mere passage of additional electrons through a previously author-
ized wire that lines in a public right-of-way does not 'use' the right-of-way and therefore does
not vest the local authority with jurisdiction over a service provider that is simply using the exist-
ing wire").
139. On the contrary, Esbin and Lutzker see a constitutional problem in any interconnec-
tion responsibilities associated with that service. See supra note 134.
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tended to local communities' property. By failing to acknowledge that
local communities have the same rights the companies do, industry
apologists in effect refuse to admit the communities' property rights.
They see the public rights-of-way as a commons, a free good, which
communication providers may use at will without paying a price.
Thus, Esbin and Lutzker generally ignore local property rights in
analyzing the extant section 253 cases. Rather than addressing the is-
sue in detail, they simply group the judicial decisions they find favor-
able as constituting "[t]he majority of federal courts""14 and extract
from these an appearance of consensus, then dismiss the judicial deci-
sions that do not fit that model as "squarely at odds with congressional
intent." 4' For similar reasons, while the article mentions the FCC ju-
risdictional issue posed by section 253(d), 42 it ignores the FCC's lack
of jurisdiction over section 253(c) when it lays great stress on whether
a court has followed "FCC precedent" and assigns great weight to
what are essentially dicta in Commission decisions such as the Troy
ruling.'
One industry treatment actually does try to dispose of the prop-
erty issue. Gardner F. Gillespie of Hogan & Hartson argues that local
governments have no property rights; they only tax and regulate.'44
Like Esbin and Lutzker, he therefore prefers the language of regula-
tion and taxation when he characterizes what local communities do
with the streets. 45 He seeks to trivialize the permanent occupation of
the public rights-of-way by communications facilities, and prefers to
redescribe cable franchise fees as fees for the privilege of providing
service rather than the rents they in fact represent.
46
Gillespie's analysis gives the appearance of tackling the property
rights issue. He makes a variety of distinctions about how localities
hold property under state law, though exclusively from the standpoint
of Dillon's Rule, which is valid in some states but not others. 47 And
he does discuss the compensation issue in section 253 cases, although
this discussion focuses primarily on labeling unfavorable decisions as
140. Id. at 38 n.129.
141. Id. at 47.
142. Id. at 37.
143. In Re TCI Cablevision of Oakland County, Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. 21396 (1997), affd, 13
F.C.C.R. 16400 (1998) [hereinafter Troy]. See infra Section V.B.1.
144. Gardner F. Gillespie, Rights-of-Way Redux: Municipal Fees on Telecommunications
Companies and Cable Operators, 107 DICK. L. REV. 209 (2002).
145. See, e.g., id. at 209, 220, 227-28.
146. Id. at 238, 246.
147. Id. at 212-14, 227, 235. Dillon's Rule holds that local governments have only those
powers expressly granted by states, or necessarily implied by those expressly granted, as opposed
to powers that may be more generally implied or reserved.
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"poorly reasoned" or "clearly wrong" '48 and claiming a growing con-
sensus in the court decisions (although he also claims those decisions
are "wildly inconsistent").'49 The centerpiece of his analysis is a sus-
tained attempt to discredit the Western Union' case, and cannot be
dealt with here in detail."'
In addressing section 253, Gillespie recites the usual claim that
the statute restricts compensation to cost recovery, despite the lack of
any textual support for this notion.15 2  He attempts to manufacture
support by referring to legislative history, although his sole discussion
of the legislative history consists of an attempt to take one floor state-
ment out of context.' He even seeks to argue that "compensation"
really means reimbursement for damages, and no more." 4
In the end, Gillespie fails to come to grips with the real underly-
ing issues. Why are the local streets not the property of the local
community? If the streets do not belong to the local community, then
who does own them? Clearly the public rights-of-way belong to some-
one. They do not belong to AT&T, Worldcom, or Comcast. Yet
those companies use the public rights-of-way, and benefit from that
use, in a way that the average citizen does not. Therefore the compa-
nies must owe compensation to someone. And unless Gillespie is pro-
posing a scheme of direct payments to the states (and he is not), that
someone must be the local communities, who hold the public rights-
of-way on behalf of their citizens.
148. Id. at 223, 234 n.157.
149. Compare id. at 211-12,219 n.64, 221 n.73, with id. at 210-11.
150. Western Union, 148 U.S. 92.
151. Gillespie, supra note 144, at 217-24. For a detailed discussion of Gillespie's analysis
of Western Union, see William Malone, Municipalities' Right to Full Compensation for Telecom-
munications Providers' Uses of the Public Rights-of-Way, DICK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
152. Gillespie, supra note 144, at 251.
153. Id. at 243. Gillespie quotes a statement of Representative Stupak, the sponsor of an
amendment to the language that became § 253(c), to the effect that communities must be able to
distinguish among telecommunications providers based on their use of the rights-of-way. 141
CONG. REC. H8460 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Stupak). Gillespie cites this
statement to support Gillespie's claim that gross revenues-based compensation is excluded by §
253 because such a fee is not directly tied to the particular use of the rights-of-way. However,
Representative Stupak did not suggest in the quoted passage or elsewhere that fees based on
gross revenues would not be permitted. On the contrary, the discussion of Stupak's amendment
proceeded on the understanding that it would indeed allow revenue-based compensation. See
infra Section IV.B.
154. Gillespie, supra note 144, at 240-41 ("The word 'compensation' suggests a reference
to the damage to be caused the holder of the underlying property right.") (emphasis added). One
would assume, for example, that Gillespie himself probably receives a compensation package
from his firm, and that it is probably not limited to reimbursement for workplace injuries. But in
normal usage, "compensation" does not refer exclusively to making up for damage. The courts
have noted that the term has much broader application than Gillespie admits. See infra Section
V.B.19.
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This is the conclusion that Gillespie is at pains to avoid, because
he wishes to convert the public rights-of-way into a free good that can
be appropriated at will by telecommunications companies. Gillespie is
emphatic in claiming that telecommunications companies cannot be
excluded from use of the rights-of-way.1 5  He admits that franchises
may be necessary, but claims that no compensation may be required
except for recovery of minimal "regulatory costs. ' 15 6 In addition, he
claims that even if there were grounds for charging compensation in
the past, new federal policies, embodied in section 253, have changed
all that."7 Thus, as indicated above, Gillespie's underlying position is
that section 253 was intended to hand over local public rights-of-way
to telecommunications companies for essentially free use. This basic
point is obscured but not altered by the extended discussion of state
and federal law, and Gillespie does not really defend that point. The
telecommunications companies have never explained why they should
have the privilege of using public property for free-unless one counts
the subsidy claim as such an argument.1'
155. See Gillespie, supra note 144, at 226, 229-30, 251. The corresponding claim on behalf
of cable operators is that they have an "expectation of renewal" that prevents them from being
evicted. Id. at 248.
156. Id. at 233-34 (although Gillespie has just argued that requiring a franchise prior to
construction violates § 253, id. at 232); 227. Gillespie warns that there will be increased resis-
tance to payments of any kind by the cable industry as well as telecommunications providers.
See id. at 247-48.
157. Id. at 226, 238-39.
158. Private building owners face analogous problems in some degree with respect to their
own property. Generally, a landlord's property rights allow the landlord to specify as part of a
rental contract the conditions under which a tenant may use the landlord's property. However,
acting under provisions of the 1996 Act, the FCC has taken several steps to override the land-
lord's rights in the name of federal telecommunications policy. Thus, the Commission first ruled
that neither local regulations nor covenants running with the land could be invoked to "impair"
an owner's right in a multiple dwelling unit (MDU) building to use video receiver antennas or
"over-the-air reception devices" ("OTARD"). It then extended this proscription to tenants, to
the extent the property on which the antenna was placed was under the exclusive control of the
tenant. See In re Preemption of Local Zoning Regulation of Satellite Earth Stations,
Implementation of Section 207 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Television Broad. Serv.
and Multichannel Multipoint Distrib. Serv., 11 F.C.C.R. 19276 (1996); In re Implementation of
Section 207 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996-Restrictions on Over-the-Air Reception
Devices: Television Broad., Multichannel Multipoint Distrib. and Direct Broad. Satellite Serv.,
13 F.C.C.R. 23874 (1998). In the "Competitive Networks" proceeding, the FCC also moved in
the direction of extending similar rules to wiring that occupies "rights-of-way" inside privately
owned buildings. See, e.g., In re Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Telecomm.
Mkts., 15 F.C.C.R. 22983 (2000), available at 2000 WL 1593327. On the other hand, thus far
these inside wiring rules have not reached the Draconian levels achieved by the FCC in the
OTARD rules. It appears that there is more resistance to giving away private property to tele-
communications carriers than to giving away public property, because we are less used to think-
ing of local communities' property as something to be protected against (federal) government
intrusion.
2003] Property Rights, Federalism, and the Public Rights-of- Way 513
It is clear from these misinterpretations that a systematic confu-
sion about the purpose and meaning of section 253 is being built up.
To correct this confusion, it is necessary to go back to the legislative
history and see how the various parts of section 253, and certain re-
lated provisions of the 1996 Act, came about.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 253
Section 253(c) was intended to protect local governments' au-
thority to manage their public rights-of-way and to receive fair and
reasonable compensation from telecommunications companies that oc-
cupy those rights-of-way. This protection is related to four additional
provisions in the 1996 Act that must be read together: section 302
(adding section 653, Establishment of Open Video Systems); subsec-
tion 303(a) (amending section 62 1(b), Preemption of Franchising Au-
thority Regulation of Telecommunications Services); subsection
303(b) (amending section 622(b)); and subsection 601(c) (Federal,
State and Local Law). The legislative history of these sections is cru-
cial in understanding the intent of Congress with regard to section
253.
The following discussion traces the development of section 253
through the Senate passage of S. 652, the Telecommunications Com-
petition and Deregulation Act of 1995; the House's substitution of
House Bill 1555; the Communications Act of 1995; and culminating
in the adoption by both houses of final language in the conference
agreement on the bills. The genesis of the four additional sections
mentioned above will then be briefly described.
A. The Senate Bill: S. 652
A draft of S. 652, the Telecommunications Competition and De-
regulation Act of 1995, was circulated by Senator Larry Pressler (R-
S.D.) on January 31, 1995."s9 A draft Democratic alternative, the Uni-
versal Service Telecommunications Act of 1995, was circulated by
Senator Hollings (D-S.C.) on February 14, 1995.160 At hearings held
on January 9, March 2, and March 21, 1995, no local government rep-
resentatives were invited to testify. 161
At the hearings, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Tex.) raised
the concern that local governments have in preserving their right to
manage and receive compensation for use of public rights-of-way by
159. S. REP. No. 104-23 (1995).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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telecommunications providers. 162 The Commerce Committee marked
up S. 652 on March 23, 1995,163 and the bill as reported included an
amendment by Senator Hutchison to new section 254 (which ulti-
mately became section 253) as follows:
(c) LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY. Nothing in this sec-
tion affects the authority of a local government to manage the
public rights-of-way or to require fair and reasonable compensa-
tion from telecommunications providers, on a competitively
neutral and nondiscriminatory basis, for use of public rights-of-
way on a nondiscriminatory basis, if the compensation is pub-
licly disclosed by such government.
The language of section 253(c) was thus inserted specifically to
protect local communities' right to do two things: (i) to manage the
public rights-of-way; and (ii) to require compensation for the use of
the public rights-of-way. Certain protective qualifications were in-
cluded (for example, "competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory");
however, the core concern was to protect not only management but
also compensation.
At this stage, S. 652 also acquired a new subsection (d), the de-
velopment of which is highly important in understanding the intent of
Congress.'64 In its original form, subsection (d), which corresponds to
section 253(d) of the statute as passed, gave the FCC the authority to
preempt local government exercise of its authority under subsection
(c), as well as to preempt state regulation under subsection (b) and
state and local authority under subsection (a). It read:
(d) If, after notice and an opportunity for public comment, the
Commission determines that a State or local government has
permitted or imposed any statute, regulation, or legal require-
ment that violates or is inconsistent with this section, the Com-
mission shall immediately preempt the enforcement of such
statute, regulation, or legal requirement to the extent necessary
to correct such violation or inconsistency.
The Committee Report 6' "explained" this language by merely repeat-
ing it.' 6
6
162. 141 CONG. REC. S 8424, S 8431 (1995).
163. S. REP. No. 104-23 (1995).
164. This amendment in the bill as reported by the Commerce, Science, and Transporta-
tion Committee was not sought by Senator Hutchison, and no Senator or committee staff mem-
ber has publicly claimed responsibility for it.
165. S. REP. No. 104-23 (1995).
166. "New section 254(d) requires the FCC, after notice and an opportunity for public
comment, to preempt enforcement of any state or local statutes, regulations or legal requirements
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The language of Senator Hutchison's amendment is virtually
identical to that finally enacted in 1996. But the language of the
stealth amendment in subsection (d) as offered in 1995 differs signifi-
cantly from the language finally enacted in 1996. Over the course of
the legislative process, Congress deliberately rejected the attempt to
give the FCC authority to rule on issues regarding management of and
compensation for local public rights-of-way.
Local governments were pleased with the affirmation of their au-
thority over rights-of-way reflected in the Hutchison amendment that
became subsection (c). They were very concerned, however, that the
broad provision for FCC preemption under subsection (d) could act to
wipe out that authority. The provision for FCC preemption of local
right-of-way management and compensation authority in subsection
(d) became the focus of local government concerns about S. 652 as it
moved to the Senate floor in 1995.
The National League of Cities, the United States Conference of
Mayors, the National Association of Counties, and the National Asso-
ciation of Telecommunications Officers and Advisors mounted a ma-
jor campaign to forestall FCC preemption of local right-of-way man-
agement and compensation authority. They were supported by the
National Governors Association and the National Conference of State
Legislatures, as well as by numerous individual cities and counties.
The Senate debated S. 652 in June 1995. Senators Dianne Fein-
stein (D-Cal.) and Dirk Kempthorne (R-Idaho) offered a floor
amendment to strike subsection (d) entirely. This amendment would
have entirely eliminated FCC jurisdiction over barriers to entry and
disputes under subsections (a), (b), and (c), leaving those disputes to
the courts. The Feinstein-Kempthorne amendment failed on a narrow
vote of 44-56 on June 14. The Senate then adopted, by voice vote, a
substitute amendment offered by Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)
and supported by Senators Feinstein and Kempthorne. The substitute
was developed after negotiations between the committee members and
Senators Feinstein and Kempthorne. The Gorton amendment as
adopted read as follows:
(d) If, after notice and an opportunity for public comment, the
Commission determines that a State or local government has
permitted or imposed any statute, regulation, or legal require-
ment that violates subsection (a) or (b), the Commission shall
preempt the enforcement of such statute, regulation, or legal re-
that violate or are inconsistent with the prohibition on entry barriers contained in subsection (a)
or other provisions of section 254." Id. at 35.
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quirement to the extent necessary to correct such violation or in-
consistency.
The purpose of the Gorton amendment was to preclude FCC ju-
risdiction over disputes involving local government authority over
rights-of-way management and compensation, while preserving FCC
jurisdiction over telecommunications business regulation by state or
local regulators. Thus, the structure of section 253 itself reflects the
distinction between governmental regulation-the subject of section
253(b)-and local governments' property-related rights regarding
compensation for and management of the rights-of-way.
The floor debate over the Feinstein-Kempthorne amendment,
together with the debate over the subsequently adopted substitute
Gorton amendment, makes clear that the Senate's intent in adopting
the Gorton amendment was to completely remove FCC jurisdiction
over subsection (c) disputes about whether local government manage-
ment of compensation requirements for rights-of-way are competi-
tively neutral or nondiscriminatory. For example, in explaining the
Feinstein- Kempthorne amendment, Senator Feinstein stated:
[T]he FCC lacks the expertise to address the cities' concerns.
As I said, if you have a city that is complicated in topography,
that is very hilly, that is very old, that has very narrow streets,
where the surfacing may be fragile, where there are earthquake
problems, you are going to have different requirements on a ca-
ble entity constantly opening and recutting the streets. The fees
should be able to reflect these regional and local distinctions. 167
Senator Kempthorne also gave an example:
When I was the mayor of Boise, Idaho, we had a particular pro-
ject that on the main street, on Idaho Street, from store front to
store front, we took everything out 3 feet below the surface and
we put in brand new utilities. I think it was something like 11
different utilities all being coordinated, put in at the same time,
then building it back up, new sidewalks, curbs, gutters, paving
of the main street. I will tell you, Mr. President, that there is no
way in the world that the FCC, 3,000 miles away, could have
coordinated that.1
68
Senator Feinstein also raised some theoretical questions about the
likely effect of subsection (d) if it were not so limited:
167. 141 CONG. REC. S8134, S8171 (1995) (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein).
168. Id. at S8173 (statement of Sen. Kempthorne).
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[I]s a city insurance or bonding requirement a barrier to entry?
Is a city requirement that a company pay fees prior to installing
any facilities to cover the cost of reviewing plans and inspecting
excavation work a barrier to entry? Is the city requirement that a
company use a particular type of excavation equipment or a dif-
ferent and specific technique suited to certain local circum-
stances to minimize the risk of major public health and safety
hazards a barrier to entry? Is a city requirement that a cable op-
erator move a trunk line away from a public park or place cables
underground rather than overhead in order to protect public
health a barrier to entry?
169
In explaining his amendment, which was ultimately adopted,
Senator Gorton made clear that the amendment was intended to re-
move FCC jurisdiction over the kinds of management and compensa-
tion issues that Senators Feinstein and Kempthorne had referred to.
He stated:
[T]he Feinstein amendment.., does have a legitimate scope. I
join with the two sponsors of the Feinstein amendment in agree-
ing that the rules that a city or county imposes on how its street
rights of way are going to be utilized, whether there are above-
ground wires or underground wires, what kind of equipment
ought to be used in excavations, what hours the excavations
should take place, are a matter of primarily local concern and, of
course, they are exempted by subsection (c) of this section.... I
am convinced that Senators Feinstein and Kempthorne are right
in the examples that they give ... [a]nd the amendment that I
propose to substitute for their amendment will leave that where
it is at the present time and will leave disputes in Federal courts
in the jurisdictions which are affected.
170
He added, "Once again, the alternative proposal [the Gorton
amendment] ... retains not only the right of local communities to deal
with their rights of way, but their right to meet any challenge on home
ground in their local district courts.
71
Senator Gorton also made clear that the kinds of actions that
would remain subject to FCC preemption authority under subsections
(a) and (b) were very different. The Commission was given jurisdic-
169. Id. at S8305 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
170. Id. at S8306 (statement of Sen. Gorton).
171. Id. at S8308 (statement of Sen. Gorton). This distinction as to venue is similar to the
distinction between section 402(a) appeals, which may be taken to courts where the party appeal-
ing resides, and section 402(b) appeals concerning federally issued radio licenses and the like,
which have been taken to the court of appeals in the District of Columbia since 1927.
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tion over grants of monopoly or exclusive rights in violation of subsec-
tion (a),1 2 or anticompetitive actions under subsection (b).
173
Senator Gorton summarized: "So my modification to the Fein-
stein amendment says that in the case of these purely local matters
dealing with rights-of-way, there will not be jurisdiction on the part of
the FCC immediately to enjoin the enforcement of those local ordi-
nances." 17 4 The Senate language, including the Gorton amendment,
was ultimately adopted as the language of section 253.
B. The House Bill: H.R. 1555
House Bill 1555, the Communications Act of 1995, was intro-
duced on May 3, 1995. Section 101 was similar to language in a
predecessor bill, House Bill 4103, which had been passed by the
House in the 103rd Congress. House Bill 1555 contained the follow-
ing language on rights-of-way management and compensation:
Section 243. Preemption.
(a) REMOVAL OF BARRIERS TO ENTRY. Except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section, no State or local statute, regula-
tion, or other legal requirement shall- (1) effectively prohibit
any carrier or other person from entering the business of provid-
ing interstate or intrastate telecommunications services or infor-
mation service; or (2) effectively prohibit any carrier or other
person providing interstate or intrastate telecommunications
services or information services from exercising the access and
interconnection rights provided under this part.
(b) STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY. Nothing in this section
shall affect the ability of State or local officials to impose, on a
nondiscriminatory basis, requirements necessary to preserve and
advance universal service, protect the public safety and welfare,
ensure the continued quality of telecommunications services, en-
sure that a provider's business practices are consistent with con-
sumer protection laws and regulations, and ensure just and rea-
sonable rates, provided that such requirements do not effectively
prohibit any carrier or person from providing interstate or intra-
state telecommunications services or information services.
172. Id. at S8306. ("This will say that if a State or some local community decides that it
does not like the bill and that there should be only one telephone company in its jurisdiction or
one cable television provider...").
173. Id. ("when they have to do with the nature of universal service, when they have to do
with the quality of telecommunications service or the protection of consumers").
174. Id. (emphasis added).
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(c) CONSTRUCTION PERMITS. Subsection (a) shall not be con-
strued to prohibit a local government from requiring a person or
carrier to obtain ordinary and usual construction or similar per-
mits for its operations if-(1) such permit is required without
regard to the nature of the business; and (2) requiring such per-
mit does not effectively prohibit any person or carrier from pro-
viding any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service or
information service.
(d) EXCEPTION. In the case of commercial mobile services, the
provisions of section 332(c)(3) shall apply in lieu of the provi-
sions of this section.
(e) PARITY OF FRANCHISE AND OTHER CHARGES. Notwith-
standing section 2(b), no local government may impose or collect
any franchise, license, permit, or right-of-way fee or any assess-
ment, rental, or any other charge or equivalent thereof as a con-
dition for operating in the locality or for obtaining access to, oc-
cupying, or crossing public rights-of-way from any provider of
telecommunications services that distinguishes between or
among providers of telecommunications services, including the
local exchange carrier. For purposes of this subsection, a fran-
chise, license, permit or right-of-way fee or an assessment,
rental, or any other charge or equivalent thereof does not include
any imposition of general applicability which does not distin-
guish between or among providers of telecommunications ser-
vices, or any tax.
Subsection (e), which did not appear in S. 652, is particularly
worthy of note. If enacted, this clause could have threatened the in-
troduction of competition by encouraging entrenched incumbents to
challenge any differences in a potential competitor's authorization to
use the public rights-of-way no matter that corresponding differences
in circumstances, lapse of time, financial qualifications, or the like,
might give good reason to set up different conditions for different enti-
ties. 1
75
The chief proponent of subsections (c) and (e) of section 243 was
Congressman Dan Schaefer (R-Colo.). The language in subsections
175. Arguably, a superficially plausible nondiscrimination provision has the perhaps unin-
tended effect of slowing the development of competition. While it sounds eminently plausible to
require evenhanded treatment, in practice this requirement can be employed by an incumbent to
delay competitive entry. This is because it provides incumbents with material for threats or ac-
tual legal action based on any differences at all that can be made out to be "discriminatory."
Moreover, a nondiscrimination provision prevents localities of their own volition from offering the
kind of incentives for new competitors that federal agencies, as indicated above, may seek to pro-
vide by giving away rights to others' property (viz. local public rights-of-way).
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(c) and (e) was generally referred to as the "MFS amendment" because
telecommunications company Metropolitan Fiber Systems (MFS) had
successfully sought inclusion of similar language in House Bill 4103 in
the 103rd Congress.
17 6
The full Commerce Committee marked up House Bill 1555 in
May 1995. At the full Commerce Committee mark-up on May 25,
Congressman Bart Stupak (D-Mich.) raised concerns about the impact
on local governments of the language in section 243. Congressman
Stupak offered and then withdrew an amendment to section 243 that
was similar to the language adopted by the Senate Committee; how-
ever, Stupak's amendment lacked the pre-Gorton amendment provi-
sion for both FCC preemption of local government right-of-way man-
agement and compensation authority.177
Congressman Stupak withdrew his amendment amid assurances
by the committee leadership that before the bill was reported to the
floor efforts would be made to work out language that would respond
to the concerns of local governments over the limiting effect of subsec-
tions (c) and (e). Congressman Joe Barton (R-Tex.) took the lead on
the majority side on behalf of local governments. Attempts were made
to reach agreement in talks and negotiations with the chief proponent
of the section 243 language, Congressman Schaefer. The considered
alternatives included a proposal to explicitly invalidate existing below-
market telephone franchises that hindered the application of reason-
able right-of-way compensation fees, and another proposal to specifi-
176. Hearings were held on House Bill 1555 on May 10, 11, and 12, 1995. Local govern-
ment representatives testified on May 11 and strongly opposed the language in new section
243-particularly that in the MFS amendment. The Telecommunications and Finance Sub-
committee marked up House Bill 1555 on May 17, 1995. No amendments were made to section
243 at the markup and the Subcommittee reported the bill with the same language in section 243
as introduced.
177. The language of the proposed Stupak amendment was as follows:
STRIKE NEW SECTION 243 (a), (b), (c), and (e) beginning on Page 12, Line 6,
AND INSERT THE FOLLOWING NEW SECTION:
Section 243. Removal of Barriers to Entry.
(a) IN GENERAL. No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal
requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to
provide interstate or intrastate telecommunications services.
(b) STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY. Nothing in this section shall affect the ability of
a State or local government to impose, on a competitively neutral basis and consistent
with section 253, requirements necessary to preserve and advance universal service,
protect the public safety and welfare, ensure the continued quality of telecommunica-
tions services, and safeguard the rights of consumers.
(c) LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY. Nothing in this Act affects the authority of a
local government to manage the public rights-of-way or to require fair and reasonable
compensation from telecommunications providers, on a competitively neutral and
nondiscriminatory basis, for use of the rights-of-way on a nondiscriminatory basis, if
the compensation required is publicly disclosed by such government.
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cally authorize fees at a level not to exceed eight percent. However, all
versions offered by Congressman Schaefer continued to include the
objectionable parity language of paragraph (e) and were rejected by
Congressmen Stupak and Barton. Stupak and Barton determined to
take the matter to the full House.
The Committee Report on House Bill 1555, filed July 24, 1995,
describes the relevant portions of section 243 as follows:
Section 243(c) makes explicit a local government's continuing
authority to issue construction permits regulating how and when
construction is conducted on roads and other public rights-of-
way. This provision clarifies that local control over construction
on public rights-of-way is not disturbed .... Section 243(e)
prohibits a local government from imposing a franchise fee or its
equivalent for access to public rights-of-way in any manner that
discriminates among providers of telecommunications services
(including the LEC). The purpose of this provision is to create
a level playing field for the development of competitive tele-
communications networks. Harmonizing the assessment of fees
from all providers is one means of creating this parity. It is not
the intent of the Committee to deny local governments their au-
thority to impose franchise fees, but rather simply to require
such fees be imposed in a nondiscriminatory manner. This
paragraph is not intended to affect local governments' franchise
powers under Title VI of the Communications Act. Local gov-
ernments can remedy any situation in which a fee structure vio-
lates this section by expanding the application of their fees to all
providers of telecommunications services, including the LECs.
Moreover, this section does not invalidate any general imposi-
tion that does not distinguish between or among providers of
telecommunications services, nor does it apply to any lawfully
imposed tax.'
78
The House debated House Bill 1555 on August 3 and 4, 1995.
The manager's amendment, adopted by the House, included a revi-
sion to section 243(b) in an attempt to head off adoption of a Barton-
Stupak amendment by striking the words "or local" and inserting a
new subsection, (c)(2), as follows:
MANAGEMENT OF RIGHTS-OF-WAY. Nothing in subsection (a)
shall affect the authority of a local government to manage the
public rights-of-way or to require fair and reasonable compensa-
tion from telecommunications providers, on a competitively
neutral and nondiscriminatory basis, for use of public rights-of-
178. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 75-76 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N 40-42.
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way on a nondiscriminatory basis, if the compensation is pub-
licly disclosed by such government.
This language was the same as part of the Hutchison amendment
adopted by the Senate Committee, and introduced the same notion of
protecting local authority to require compensation and to manage the
public rights-of-way. It left in place, however, the problematic parity
language of the Schaefer-MFS provision in subsection (e).1
79
The Barton-Stupak amendment was one of very few amend-
ments permitted by the House Rules Committee under the rule gov-
erning debate on House Bill 1555. The Barton-Stupak amendment
proposed to strike all of section 243 as reported by the House Com-
mittee and to substitute new language. The new language was essen-
tially the same as that of the Senate Committee, with three qualifica-
tions: (1) it would extend the safe harbor of subsection (b) to local as
well as State governments; (2) it would apply the safe harbor in sub-
section (c) to the entire Act, not just that section; and (3) it would
eliminate any reference to FCC preemption jurisdiction over State or
local actions.
The Barton-Stupak amendment read as follows:
Section 243. Removal of Barriers to Entry.
(a) IN GENERAL. No State or local statute, regulation, or other
State or local legal requirement may prohibit or have the effect
of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide interstate or in-
trastate telecommunications services.
(b) STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY. Nothing in this section
shall affect the ability of State or local officials to impose, on a
competitively neutral basis and consistent with section 247 (re-
lating to universal service), requirements necessary to preserve
and advance universal service, protect the public safety and wel-
fare, ensure the continued quality of telecommunications ser-
vices, and safeguard the rights of consumers.
(c) LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY. Nothing in this Act af-
fects the authority of a local government to manage the public
rights-of-way or to require fair and reasonable compensation
from telecommunications providers, on a competitively neutral
and nondiscriminatory basis, for use of the rights-of-way on a
nondiscriminatory basis, if the compensation required is pub-
licly disclosed by such government.
179. See supra Section IV.B (quoting subsection (e)).
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(d) EXCEPTION. In the case of commercial mobile services, the
provisions of section 332(c)(3) shall apply in lieu of the provi-
sions of this section.180
In his remarks on the House floor during the debate on House
Bill 1555, Congressman Stupak particularly stressed that the Barton-
Stupak amendment would delete the requirement for parity between
the incumbent local exchange carrier (LEC) and other providers, and
instead could allow for different compensation from different provid-
ers for use of the rights-of-way. Stupak stated:
Local governments must be able to distinguish between different
telecommunications providers .... The manager's amendment
states that local governments would have to charge the same fee
to every company, regardless of how much or how little they use
the rights-of-way or rip up our streets. Because the contracts
have been in place for many years, some as long as 100 years, if
our amendment is not adopted, if the Barton-Stupak amendment
is not adopted, you will have companies in many areas securing
free access to public property. Taxpayers paid for this property,taxpayers paid to maintain this property, and it is simply not fair
to ask the taxpayers to continue to subsidize telecommunications
181companies ....
Congressman Barton stated a similar intent:
[The amendment] explicitly guarantees that cities and local gov-
ernments have the right to not only control access within their
city limits, but also to set the compensation level for the use of
that right-of-way .... The Chairman's [Manager's] amend-
ment has tried to address this problem. It goes part of the way,
but not the entire way. The Federal Government has absolutely
no business telling State and local governments how to price ac-
cess to their local right-of-way. 182
It was thus clear that the Barton-Stupak language was intended
to allow local communities to charge fees to telecommunications com-
panies, including the local exchange carriers, to avoid forcing local
communities to subsidize these companies, and to allow the commu-
nity to "set the compensation level."' 83
In arguing strongly (and unsuccessfully) against the Barton-
Stupak amendment, Congressman Schaefer and others made many of
180. 141 CONG. REC. H8460 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1995) (personal explanation of Rep. Stu-
pak).
181. Id. (statement of Rep. Stupak).
182. Id. (statement of Rep. Barton).
183. Id.
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the same arguments that the telecommunications industry has since
made in petitions to the FCC and the courts. For example, Con-
gressman Schaefer claimed that acceptance of the Barton-Stupak
amendment "is going to allow the local governments to slow down and
even derail the movement to real competition." 184  Congressman
Fields claimed:
[Cities are allowed to charge incumbent telephone companies lit-
tle or nothing because of] a century-old charter ... which may
even predate the incorporation of the city itself ... [T]hey
threaten to Balkanize the development of our national telecom-
munications infrastructure .... When a percentage of revenue
fee is imposed by a city on a telecommunications provider for
use of rights-of-way, that fee becomes a cost of doing business
for that provider, and, if you will, the cost of a ticket to enter the
market. That is anticompetitive .... [W]hat does control of
rights-of-way have to do with assessing a fee of 11 percent of
gross revenue? Absolutely nothing."8
It is significant that the objections assumed that the Barton-
Stupak language would allow a fee based on a percentage of gross
revenues, not merely on cost recovery.
After hearing these arguments, the House rejected them and
adopted the Barton-Stupak amendment by a vote of 338-86. Addi-
tionally, by adopting Barton-Stupak, the House strongly rejected the
Schaefer-Fields arguments for the MFS parity language. By adopting
Barton-Stupak, which was the same as the Senate language with re-
spect to fair and reasonable compensation for right-of-way use, the
House overwhelmingly endorsed the propositions that the local gov-
ernment is the appropriate body to make compensation decisions, and
also that differential compensation based on market valuation is not
discriminatory. There is no trace of an assumption that the compen-
sation determined by a local community would be limited to costs.
On the contrary, as pointed out above, the discussion assumed it
would not.
C. The Conference Agreement
Despite the overwhelming House vote for the Barton-Stupak
amendment, the close vote on Feinstein-Kempthorne, and the unani-
mous adoption of the Gorton amendment in the Senate, the debate
over right-of-way management and compensation language continued
into the conference process. The final conference agreement on Senate
184. Id.
185. Id. at H8461 (statement of Rep. Fields).
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Bill 652/House Bill 1555 as adopted by both houses incorporates the
Senate language of section 253. The final law thus preserves the rec-
ognition that "fair and reasonable" market-level compensation need
not be identical for differently situated users of the public rights-of-
way. It also preserves the safe harbor protecting the authority of local
governments over rights-of-way management and compensation and
reflects the clear intent of Congress that the FCC is to have no juris-
diction over subsection (c) disputes, leaving them to the courts.
D. The Legislative History of Section 253 Supports a Property-Rights
Approach
The language of section 253 is consistent with treating compen-
sation for use of public rights-of-way as rent. And the language is
broad enough to encompass all forms of compensation-in-kind as
well as cash. However, the compensation does not have to be exactly
the same for all users. Just as office building tenants or apartment
building tenants-even tenants in the same line of business-may pay
different rents, right-of-way rental rates may depend on the nature
and scope of the space occupied, the services provided to the tenant,
the length of the lease, the market conditions at the time the lease was
signed, and other relevant, reasonable distinctions.
A deregulatory approach assumes that companies are free to set
prices and other conditions for use of their property unless there are
reasons why regulation is necessary. In the same way, section 253 rec-
ognizes that local communities are also free to set prices and manage-
ment conditions, unless and until a court concludes that such terms
are inconsistent with the requirements of section 253(c) and form a
barrier to entry under section 253(a).
Section 253 thus creates a two-step hurdle for any telecommuni-
cations provider seeking to challenge a right-of-way management or
compensation requirement imposed by a local government. The first
hurdle is that local governments' conditions are not preempted unless
they fall within subsection (a)-that is, they "prohibit or have the ef-
fect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide" any telecom-
munications service. Even if a right-of-way management or compen-
sation requirement is discriminatory or not competitively neutral
under subsection (c), a company that objects to the requirement must
first prove that the requirement actually "prohibits" or has "the effect
of prohibiting" the service before section 253(c) even comes into
play.'86 If a local requirement does fall within the scope of section
186. It should be evident that "prohibits" here must mean more than "inconveniences" or
"reduces the profits of."
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253(a), the second hurdle is then to prove that the local government
has not acted "on a competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory ba-
sis." The local government enjoys a safe harbor if the local rights-of-
way requirement is consistent with subsection (c).
In other words, a local government may manage its public rights-
of-way and may require fair and reasonable compensation, even if its
actions would otherwise be considered to be a barrier to entry under
subsection (a). Moreover, only a court-not the FCC-has jurisdic-
tion to consider whether a particular local right-of-way management
or compensation requirement falls within the safe harbor of subsection
(c).
Section 253(a) generally prohibits legal restrictions on new com-
petitive entry to any telecommunications business. But subsections
(b) and (c) in section 253 limit the reach of the section 253(a) prohibi-
tion. They clarify that subsection (a) only refers to the authority to
license entry into the business. State and local governments retain
their authority both to manage the public rights-of-way and to require
fair and reasonable compensation from telecommunications providers
for their use of public rights-of-way. That authority is rooted in prop-
erty rights in the rights-of-way, and in the federalist structure that
preserves such local rights against suppression by overarching authori-
ties at the federal level.
E. Related Sections of the 1996 Act
Four additional sections of the 1996 Act cast further light on the
intent of Congress with respect to preemption of local communities'
control over their public rights-of-way. These four sections fill out an
overall approach that carefully locates local control over the public
rights-of-way in the context of the fundamental local property rights
that antedate federal cable and telecommunications law.
1. Section 302: Open Video System
Section 302 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 adds a new
section 653 to the Communications Act of 1934.87 That section cre-
ates a new regulatory classification, "Open Video System" (OVS).
OVS was created to encourage competition by providing an alternate
regulatory structure through which telephone companies could offer
cable services.'88
187. Now codified at 47 U.S.C. § 573 (2002).
188. Subsection (c), REDUCED REGULATORY BURDENS FOR OPEN VIDEO SYSTEMS, of §
653 (now codified as 47 U.S.C. § 573 (2002)) states:
(1) IN GENERAL. Any provision that applies to a cable operator under
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Section 653, which provides for open video systems, sprang forth
in the conference agreement, and replaced provisions in House Bill
1555 and Senate Bill 652 that were based on the earlier "video dial-
tone" model created by the FCC for telephone company entry into the
multichannel video market. 89 No real legislative history other than
the conference report exists, but to the extent that OVS has some simi-
larities to earlier video dialtone or video platform provisions of the two
bills, there is some guidance as to intent.
As with section 253, local governments were concerned about
protecting their authority over their public rights-of-way when they
saw drafts of the OVS provisions. As a result of intense lobbying and
the insistence of the Barton-Stupak and Feinstein-Kempthorne spon-
sors, language was included in the conference report in the section on
OVS that echoes the language of section 253.190 The Conference Re-
port also clarified what sort of compensation was involved: "Open
video systems may be subject to fees imposed by local franchising au-
(A) sections 613 (other than subsection (a) thereof), 616, 623(f), 628, 631, and 634 of
this title, shall apply,
(B) sections 611, 614, and 615 of this title, and section 325 of title III, shall apply in
accordance with the regulations prescribed under paragraph (2), and sections 612 and
617, and parts III and IV (other than sections 623(f), 628, 631, and 634), of this title
shall not apply, to any operator of an open video system for which the Commission
has approved a certificatioAi under this section.
(2) IMPLEMENTATION.
(A) COMMISSION ACTION. In the rulemaking proceeding to prescribe the regulations
required by subsection (b)(1), the Commission shall, to the extent possible, impose
obligations that are no greater or lesser than the obligations contained in the provi-
sions described in paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection. The Commission shall com-
plete all action (including any reconsideration) to prescribe such regulations no later
than 6 months after the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
(B) FEES. An operator of an open video system under this part may be subject to the
payment of fees on the gross revenues of the operator for the provision of cable service
imposed by a local franchising authority or other governmental entity, in lieu of the
franchise fees permitted under section 622. The rate at which such fees are imposed
shall not exceed the rate at which franchise fees are imposed on any cable operator
transmitting video programming in the franchise area, as determined in accordance
with regulations prescribed by the Commission. An operator of an open video system
may designate that portion of a subscriber's bill attributable to the fee under this sub-
paragraph as a separate item on the bill.
(3) REGULATORY STREAMLINING. With respect to the establishment and operation
of an open video system, the requirements of this section shall apply in lieu of, and
not in addition to, the requirements of title II.
189. See Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, §§ 63.54-63.58,
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, First Report and Order and Second Further Notice of
Inquiry, 7 F.C.C.R. 300 (1991).
190. "The Conferees intend that an operator of an open video system under this part shall
be subject, to the extent permissible under State and local law, to the authority of a local govern-
ment to manage its public rights-of-way in a nondiscriminatory and competitively neutral man-
ner." H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 178 (1995).
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thorities, but such fees are in lieu of fees required under section 622
[cable franchise fees]."'' Open video systems were also made subject
to the same kind of in-kind compensation that can be required of cable
operators under section 611 (public, educational and government ac-
cess and institutional networks).192 Thus, an OVS using the public
rights-of-way would typically be subject to fees based on a percentage
of gross revenues, like a cable operator, in addition to in-kind benefits.
The significance of the OVS provision is heightened by its sub-
sequent history. When the FCC made rules to implement section
653, the Commission sought to bypass local right-of-way authority
and to claim that an OVS operator could automatically use any local
public rights-of-way. The Fifth Circuit decisively rejected this at-
tempt by the FCC to give away local property, and thus established a
telling precedent with respect to interpretations of section 253 that
would involve the same sort of end run.
193
2. Section 303(a): Telecommunications Services Under a Cable
Franchise
Section 303 (Preemption of Franchising Authority Regulation of
Telecommunications Services) as adopted in the 1996 Act reads as fol-
lows:
(a) PROVISION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES BY A
CABLE OPERATOR. Section 621(b) (47 U.S.C. § 541(b)) is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new para-
graph:
(3)(A) If a cable operator or affiliate thereof is engaged in the
provision of telecommunications services-
(i) such cable operator or affiliate shall not be required to obtain
a franchise under this title for the provision of telecommunica-
tions services: and
(ii) the provisions of this title shall not apply to such cable
operator or affiliate for the provision of telecommunications ser-
vices.
191. Id. See 47 U.S.C. § 573(c)(2)(B) (2002).
192. The statute indicated that an OVS would be subject to the public, educational, and
governmental (PEG) access requirements of the Cable Act, found in § 611, according to rules set
by the FCC. See 47 U.S.C. § 573(c)(1)(B) (2002). The FCC interpreted this to mean that OVS
operators must provide PEG support comparable to that of the cable operator. See 47 C.F.R. §
76.1505 (2002).
193. See infra Section V.A. for a detailed discussion of the OVS appeal.
[Vol. 26:475
2003] Property Rights, Federalism, and the Public Rights-of-Way 529
(B) A franchising authority may not impose any requirement
under this title that has the purpose or effect of prohibiting, lim-
iting, restricting, or conditioning the provision of a telecommu-
nications service by a cable operator or an affiliate thereof.
(C) A franchising authority may not order a cable operator or af-
filiate thereof
(i) to discontinue the provision of a telecommunications service;
or
(ii) to discontinue the operation of a cable system, to the extent
such cable system is used for the provision of a telecommunica-
tions service, by reason of the failure of such cable operator or
affiliate thereof to obtain a franchise or franchise renewal under
this title with respect to the provision of such telecommunica-
tions service.
(D) Except as otherwise permitted by section[s] 611 and 612, a
franchising authority may not require a cable operator to provide
any telecommunications service or facilities, other than institu-
tional networks, as a condition of the initial grant of a franchise,
a franchise renewal, or a transfer of a franchise.
(b) FRANCHISE FEES. Section 622(b) (47 U.S.C. § 542(b)) is
amended by inserting 'to provide cable services' immediately be-
fore the period at the end of the first sentence thereof.
Section 303(a) complements section 302. Section 302 removes
the prohibitions that had previously existed in federal law against the
provision of video programming by telephone companies directly to
subscribers in their own service areas, and also establishes OVS.
19 4
Section 303(a) preempts local franchising authorities' regulation of
telecommunications services through a cable franchise. Both sections,
however, also make clear that these requirements do not exempt a
company from local property rights. As noted above, when telephone
companies provide video, either as cable operators or as operators of
an open video system, they are subject to the same right-of-way man-
agement and compensation authority as are cable operators. Con-
versely, when cable companies provide telecommunications services,
they are subject to the same right-of-way management and compensa-
tion authority as are other telecommunications providers.
194. As noted supra Section IV.E.1.
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For purposes of understanding the intent of section 253, the key
step in the development of section 303(a) is the one taken in confer-
ence, when section 201(b) of Senate Bill 652 and section 107 of House
Bill 1555 were combined into section 303 of the Conference Agree-
ment. Local governments were concerned that the language in the
combined section should not be read to undermine local government
authority over right-of-way management and compensation with re-
spect to all telecommunications providers, including cable operators
that offered non-cable services. The sponsors of the Barton-Stupak
amendment and the sponsors of the Feinstein-Kempthorne amend-
ment were concerned that a misreading of the prohibition on "fran-
chising" for telecommunications services provided by cable operators
might be taken to undermine the protection of local government au-
thority that their amendments had achieved in section 253. This con-
cern was so significant that they threatened to use the newly enacted
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) to stop the bill if the lan-
guage in what became sections 302 and 303 was not clarified to fully
protect local government right-of-way management and compensation
authority over all telecommunications service providers. Application
of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act would have spotlighted-and
shot down-the lurking potential for commandeering local property
that was buried in the original language.
Following an intense effort in the last stages of the conference,
section 303(a) was redrafted so that the limiting phrase "under this ti-
tle" (referring to Title VI, the Cable Act) was added in the one place
where it did not already appear-to subsection (B) from House Bill
1555. As a result, the prohibition on requiring telecommunications as
part of a "franchise" referred only to cable franchises under Title VI of
the Communications Act. The effect of this amendment was highly
significant. The fact that cable franchises were prevented from ad-
dressing telecommunications issues by the new language did not de-
prive local communities of other preexisting authority, including con-
sumer protection authority as well as property rights in the public
rights-of-way. It simply meant that such authority could not be exer-
cised through, or derived from, a cable franchise. By distinguishing
between cable (Title VI) franchises and other local authority, the pro-
vision could apply the desired prohibition to the former without
affecting any authority a community might have under the latter. The
insertion of the words "under this title" thus made it clear that tele-
communications franchises or other forms of agreements or require-
ments under authority other than the Cable Act were not prohibited
by the 1996 Act.
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Thus, under this section as well as under section 253, local gov-
ernments retain whatever ability they might have under their preexist-
ing powers to require or use non-cable franchises as their means of
managing telecommunications providers' use of and payment for
rights-of-way.
3. Section 303(b): Cable Franchise Fees
The change in the other subsection of section 303, 303(b)
(amending section 622(b), 47 U.S.C. section 542(b)), is significant
here for similar reasons. Section 622(b) sets a cap of five percent of
gross revenues on cable (Title VI) franchise fees.' 95 The addition of
the words "to provide cable services" limited that cap to the gross
revenues from cable services only.'96 If a cable franchise were the only
instrument available through which a local community could claim
compensation from a company using the community's property for
both cable and non-cable purposes, the result would have been a
windfall gain and a subsidy for cable operators: they could use local
property for both cable and non-cable purposes, yet pay only on the
cable revenues. But in fact the language does not yield that inequita-
ble result, because the statute leaves non-cable franchises (or other lo-
cal authorizations) available as a separate means of dealing with the
non-cable uses of the public rights-of-way.
The Conference Report summarized the result with respect to
section 303, both (a) and (b):
The conferees intend that, to the extent permissible under State
and local law, telecommunications services, including those pro-
vided by a cable company, shall be subject to the authority of a
local government to, in a nondiscriminatory and competitively
neutral way, manage its public rights of way and charge fair and
reasonable fees. 97
The reappearance of language echoing that of section 253 is not
by accident. The various sections described above incorporate a care-
ful separation between cable and non-cable authority. Cable fran-
chises govern cable matters and involve compensation for the use of
the public rights-of-way for cable services. Non-cable (i.e., not "un-
der Title VI") authority governs non-cable matters and involves com-
pensation for non-cable uses of the public rights-of-way. And, con-
trary to the claims of the commentators briefly discussed in Section
195. See47 U.S.C. § 572(b) (2002).
196. Id.
197. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 180 (1995).
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III, the 1996 Act did not seek to suppress local authority of the non-
cable type. Rather, it carefully preserved that authority.
4. Section 601(c): Restriction on Preemptive Effect
The final ancillary section of the 1996 Act discussed here, section
601(c), sets the overall framework for construing the meaning of the
Act and the intent of Congress in regard to state and local authority.
Section 601(c)(1) provides:
(c) FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAW.
(1) NO IMPLIED EFFECT. This Act and the amendments made
by this Act shall not be construed to modify, impair, or super-
sede Federal, State or local law unless expressly so provided in
such Act or amendments. 9
This language originated in House Bill 1555, which, as intro-
duced, contained in section 401(c) a general savings clause:
(c) FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAW. (1) Except as provided
in paragraph (2), parts II and III of title II of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 shall not be construed to modify, impair, or
supersede Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so pro-
vided in such part. (2) Parts II and III of title II of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934 shall supersede State and local law to the
extent that such law would impair or prevent the operation of
such part.' 99
This language remained the same through Subcommittee and full
Committee mark-up. The House Committee report explains: "This
subsection also contains a savings clause for State and local law, except
'to the extent such law would impair or prevent the operation of this
Act.' "200
The conferees retained the general savings provision of the
House language. The conference report states that "[t]he conferee
agreement adopts the House provision stating that the bill does not have
any effect on any other Federal, State, or local law unless the bill ex-
pressly so provides."21' The conference report makes Congress's intent
198. Subsection 601(c)(2) contains an additional, specific savings clause regarding state and
local taxation, which is not relevant here.
199. Communications Act of 1995, H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. § 401(c) (1995) (as intro-
duced).
200. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, at 124 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 91 92.
201. H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 201 (1995) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 215-16.
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clear: "This provision prevents affected parties from asserting that the bill
impliedly preempts other laws. ,202
Section 601 thus establishes that a preemption in any provision of
the 1996 Act must be express and explicit. Congress specifically
barred vague claims of the sort described earlier in Section III, arguing
that state or local authority should be preempted on the basis of broad
federal policies. In the 1996 Act, preemption must be read narrowly.
It may not be construed beyond the specific statements of preemption
found in the Act.
The above analysis makes clear that Congress intended to pre-
serve, not preempt, local authority over the public rights-of-way. As
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 passed through the various
stages of the legislative process en route to its final enactment, Con-
gress arrived at a coherent stance in favor of (1) preserving local au-
thority with respect to right-of-way management and compensation,
and (2) ensuring that any disputes would be resolved in the courts
rather than at the FCC. The lengthy debate regarding the preserva-
tion of local rights, and their ultimate inclusion in the 1996 Act, dem-
onstrates that the 1996 Act embodies a deliberate policy decision by
Congress to protect local communities' property rights and the central
democratic value of federalism.
V. SECTION 253 IN THE COURTS
In light of the legislative history of section 253, it is remarkable
that any objective decisionmaker could fail to recognize that the 1996
Act preserves and protects local rights to management and compensa-
tion in the public rights-of-way. Nonetheless, local communities
striving for courts to recognize these limitations on section 253 pre-
emption have experienced mixed results. One reason for these mixed
results is that courts and other decision makers have been frequently
misled by discussions that ignore the roots of local authority in local
property rights. When a court perceives public rights-of-way as com-
pensable property belonging to a local community, the court correctly
interprets section 253. When a court is distracted by the notion that
compensation and management requirements are a form of entry regu-
lation, the court gets the interpretation wrong.
The following discussion seeks to demonstrate this analysis by
reviewing the case law on section 253 from the point of view of prop-
erty rights. The OVS decision is reviewed first, as a key precursor to
202. Id. (emphasis added).
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the correct understanding of the 1996 Act. The section 253 decisions
to date are then reviewed in light of the above analysis.
A. The OVS Court Rebuffs the FCC's Attempt to Give Away Local
Public Rights-of- Way
The 1996 Act introduced a new regulatory category, "Open
Video Systems," to encourage entry into the multichannel video mar-
ket.20 3 The statute required the FCC to prescribe regulations to im-
plement this regulatory construct within six months, including any re-
consideration. 24 Accordingly, on March 11, 1996, the FCC released a
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on open video
systems.0 ' Appeals were filed by various parties, challenging the Or-
ders on constitutional and statutory grounds, and consolidated in the
Fifth Circuit.0 6
On appeal, local communities argued that the FCC implemented
the OVS provisions by taking steps that Congress did not mandate
and which were inconsistent with the statute. 27  The Commission
claimed the authority to grant OVS operators an "enforceable right" to
use public rights-of-way without local authorization. 20  It also pur-
ported to limit the compensation paid for use of the rights-of-way to a
specific percentage of gross revenues derived by the OVS operator and
its affiliates. 29 The local community appellants argued that the FCC
lacked authority to give away local property in this fashion. 210 Local
rights over local rights-of-way were not, as the Commission claimed,
derived solely from federal law and terminable by federal fiat."'
Rather, those rights preceded federal law, and local property could not
be commandeered at will for federal purposes.2t2
The Fifth Circuit struck down the FCC's claim to exempt OVS
operators from local franchising.213  Without reaching the Fifth and
Tenth Amendment issues raised by the appellants, the court relied on
203. See supra Section IV.E.1.
204. See 47 U.S.C. § 573(c)(2)(A) (2002).
205. The Second Order, on reconsideration, was released less than three months later, on
June 3, 1996, and a final round of reconsideration, resulting in a Third Report and Order, con-
cluded on August 8, 1996. In re Implementation of Section 302 of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Open Video Systems, 11 F.C.C.R. 14639 (1996); 11 F.C.C.R. 18223 (1996); 11
F.C.C.R. 20227 (1996).
206. See City of Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1999).
207. Id. at 347.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 349.
210. Id. at 347.
211. Id. at 348.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 345.
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the plain meaning of the statute. 214 Because local franchising authority
predated the Cable Act, an affirmative preemption by the FCC would
be necessary to override that authority. 215  The court found such a
claim of preemption to be at odds with the 1996 Act's preservation of
state and local authority.
216
Thus, the OVS decision, while it does not deal with section 253,
goes directly to a key issue in the conflict over that provision: local
right-of-way authority is not a federal gift-it predates federal law.
The FCC cannot preempt that local authority without specific statu-
tory authorization. No claim of implied preemption can stand in light
of section 601. These conclusions establish a sizable part of the foun-
dation for sound analysis of section 253 cases.
B. Section 253 Decisions from a Property Rights Perspective
The following discussion addresses first those section 253 deci-
sions that have come from the FCC, and then those from the courts.
In each group the decisions are reviewed generally in chronological or-
der to trace the sequence of developments.
1. FCC Decisions Under Section 253
The FCC has issued a number of orders pertaining to section
253. The first was Classic Telephone, Inc., Petition for Preemption of
Local Entry Barriers,217 in which Classic was able to show that two cit-
ies' denial of a telephone franchise violated section 253(a).218 While
the Commission ruled against the cities in this case, it did observe,
with the legislative history of the Act fresh in its mind, that section
253 was not intended to eliminate local franchising authority:
We do not believe that Congress intended to remove franchising
authority from State and local governments. Nothing in the lan-
guage of the 1996 Act or the legislative history reflects this in-
tention. In fact, as discussed below, section 253(b) and 253(c)
recognize the authority of States and localities (including the
Cities) to impose franchise requirements for certain purposes,
214. Id. at 347.
215. Id. at 348. ("The Commission could come to a contrary conclusion only by reading its
preemptive authority broadly. But § 601(c) precludes a broad reading of preemptive authority, as
does [Gregory v. Ashcroft], 501 U.S. [452,1 at 460 [(1991)] .... Chevron deference is not appro-
priate here, for Congress, in § 601(c), already has resolved the issue of preemption of local fran-
chising authority.")
216. Id.
217. In re Classic Tel. Inc., Petition for Preemption, Declaratory Ruling and Injunctive
Relief, 11 F.C.C.R. 13082 (1996). Order issued by 12 F.C.C.R. 15619 (1997), pet. dismissed, 14
F.C.C.R. 960 (1999), recons. den., 14 F.C.C.R. 19974 (1999).
218. Classic, 11 F.C.C.R. at 13092-93.
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and as such, these sections preserve the authority of States and
localities to deny a franchise application until such time the ap-
plicant complies with these permitted legal requirements.
219
Classic Telephone was followed by New England Public Communi-
cations Council, in which the Commission preempted certain Con-
necticut restrictions regarding provision of payphone service. 220
In these early section 253 decisions the Commission did not have
to confront the issue of local community compensation from telecom-
munications right-of-way users. There were, however, signs that the
FCC was less open to local governments' rights than to those of pri-
vate parties. For example, in 1997 the Commission was asked to ap-
ply section 253 to preempt a state law that prohibited municipal tele-
communications systems from competing with privately owned
systems. 2 1 The Texas Public Utility Commission asked the FCC to
rule that the prohibition on municipal entry contained in the Texas
Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1995 (PURA) violated the 1996
Act.222 The FCC rejected this petition, holding that municipalities are
creatures of the state and the state (through legislation) had authority
to keep them out of the telecommunications market.223 The Commis-
sion's rejection was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit.
224
The issue of localities' right to set requirements for right-of-way
use finally came before the FCC in the Troy matter.225 In 1997, the
Commission issued a much-anticipated order, 226 and declined to ad-
dress whether an ordinance of the City of Troy, Michigan, requiring
telecommunications providers to obtain a separate franchise to use lo-
cal public rights-of-way was compatible with section 253.227 The
Commission did hold that the city could not make such telecommuni-
cations requirements a condition of permits issued under the city's ca-
ble franchise, underlining the sharp distinction in federal law between
the laws governing cable and those governing telecommunications. 228
219. Id.at 28.
220. In re New England Pub. Communications Council Petition for Preemption Pursuant
to Section 253, 11 F.C.C.R. 19713 (1996), recons. den., 12 F.C.C.R. 5215 (1997).
221. See In re Pub. Util. Comm'n of Texas, 13 F.C.C.R. 3460 (1997).
222. Id.at 5.
223. Id. at 16.
224. City of Abilene v. FCC, 164 F.3d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The opposite fate of a second
FCC order regarding municipal entry is discussed below. See infia Section V.B.17.
225. Troy, 12 F.C.C.R. 21396 (1997). See supra note 143 for full case name.
226. Id.
227. It was consistent with the jurisdictional barrier discussed above for the FCC not to
rule on a matter implicating § 253(c). The Commission's declared reason for declining to rule,
however, was that the record failed to demonstrate that the Troy ordinance had had the "imper-
missible effect of prohibiting" TCI from providing telecommunications service. Id. at 99.
228. Id. at 100.
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The FCC's order also included dicta expressing concern about local
communities' possible creation of what the Commission described as
an unnecessary 'third tier' of regulation" and about possible dis-
criminatory requirements favoring incumbents.229
In 1999, the FCC struck down two state laws under section 253:
the Commission preempted a Tennessee state law that protected small
local exchange carriers (those serving fewer than 100,000 access lines)
from competitive entry, 230 and rejected a petition by Minnesota for
approval of an exclusive agreement with a single provider for the use
of state-owned rights-of-way.23'
Since 1999, the Commission appears to have been relatively re-
strained in its dealings with claims under section 253.232 In general,
the FCC seems to have shunned the issue of local community prop-
erty rights in actual section 253 matters, and to the extent the Com-
mission's views can be ascertained, it must be from positions taken in
non-253 cases, such as the OVS matter discussed above.233
2. Court Decisions Through 1999
Not surprisingly, most decisions under section 253 have come
from the courts.234 The first such result, in GST Tucson Lightwave,
235
found that there was no private right of action under section 2 53(c). 36
The next year, a Texas court granted a preliminary injunction against
an Austin telecommunications ordinance said to require franchise fees,
application fees, disclosure of extensive information by the applicant,
and EEO information, because enforcement of these requirements by
229. Id. at 103, 105, 107. These observations have been extensively quoted by the tele-
communications industry in § 253 contexts.
230. InreAVR, L.P., 14 F.C.C.R. 11064 (1999).
231. In re Petition of the State of Minn. for a Ruling Regarding the Effect of Section 253 on
an Agreement to Install Fiber Optic Wholesale Transp. Capacity in State Freeway Rights-of-
Way, 14 F.C.C.R. 21697 (1999).
232. The FCC has, however, applied for certiorari to preserve its municipal entry decision
in the Missouri Municipal League case. See Section V.B. 17., infra.
233. See supra Section V.A. See also infra note 257 (in which the FCC stubbornly opposed
the notion that franchise fees constituted rent for right-of-way use); see also FCC's amicus brief
in White Plains, infra note 453.
234. This is appropriate in light of§ 253(d).
235. GST Tucson Lightwave, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 950 F. Supp. 968 (D. Ariz. 1996),
appeal dismissed and remanded, 134 F.3d 377 (9th Cir. 1998).
236. Tucson, 950 F. Supp. at 969. This holding, however, was not generally upheld in later
decisions and may best be regarded as making the point that § 253(c), with its nondiscrimination
requirement, represents merely a safe harbor against potential actions under § 253(a), not an in-
dependent ground for complaint. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Hawthorne, 188 F. Supp. 2d
1169 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2001) (Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Granting
Plaintiffs' Request for Judicial Notice).
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the city could result in a barrier to entry. 237 The Austin court viewed
these requirements as focused on "determining whether a particular
entity is fit to provide telecommunications services in Texas"-not on
right-of-way management or compensation-and hence as essentially
duplicating state Public Utility Commission regulation.23" The court
therefore enjoined the city's ordinance primarily on state law
grounds.239
Another district court held that the city of Dallas could require a
telecommunications provider to obtain a franchise, but only condi-
tioned on compliance with reasonable right-of-way regulations and
fees.24" Dallas I also pointed out that the nondiscrimination require-
ment of section 253(c) did not require that the City treat differently
situated providers identically.241 However, this result was qualified in
a subsequent decision holding no such franchise could be required for
wireless providers, or for resellers, on the grounds that they did not
physically "use" the public rights-of-way for their own facilities.242
The City's authority over its public rights-of-way forms the basis, in
the Dallas decisions, for the right to require a franchise and associated
fees. 243
A decision of the Iowa Supreme Court in City of Hawarden v. US
West Communications, Inc.,244 introduced a major theme in the develop-
ing decisions: the leap from the logical requirement that compensation
be "fair and reasonable" (to qualify for the section 253(c) safe harbor) to
the unconnected notion that such compensation must be limited to a
city's actual costs for the public rights-of-way, and so a city could not
charge a fee based on gross revenues. 245  This result may be related to
the fact that Iowa law has long denied local communities a property in-
terest in the public rights-of-way and hence a proprietary right to obtain
compensation for right-of-way use.246  Despite the fact that sec-
tion 253(c) includes no such cost-based restriction as is suggested in
237. AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Austin, 975 F. Supp. 928, 934
(W.D. Tex. 1997).
238. Id. at 941. The court noted that both parties agreed that under the 1996 Act, "mu-
nicipalities retain their traditional power to regulate and demand compensation for the physical
use of their public rights-of-way." Id. at 939.
239. Id. at 940.
240. AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d 582,
(N.D. Tex. June 8, 1998) [hereinafter Dallas I].
241. Id.
242. AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 52 F. Supp. 2d 756
(N.D. Tex. July 7, 1998) [hereinafter Dallas II].
243. Seesuprann.237-39.
244. 590 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 1999).
245. Id. at 509.
246. See, e.g., City of Des Moines v. Iowa Tel. Co., 162 N.W. 323 (Iowa 1917).
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Hawarden, it has been a persistent theme in industry lobbying and liti-
gation to claim that local communities cannot receive payment for the
full value of their assets, but may only recover their costs.247 In the most
extreme formulations, the argument is that a community may receive
only the incremental costs of administration, leaving aside even the costs
of acquiring and maintaining the public rights-of-way, much less its ac-
tual value.248
A number of section 253 decisions in 1999 attend more closely to
the actual language and meaning of the section. For example, another
state court decision upholding a city's five percent right-of-way fee
clearly distinguished such a fee from a tax.249 In so doing, the South
Carolina Supreme Court avoided the assumption that any payment that
generates revenues for a local government must be a tax, even if it arises
from a market transaction in which the payer receives valuable use of an
asset in exchange for the payment.25 °
More significantly, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in 1999 de-
nied a preliminary injunction under section 253 to a cable operator that
filed a claim alleging discriminatory treatment.25' In Cablevision of Bos-
ton, the court addressed Cablevision's claim that the City had applied
different rules to Cablevision and to Boston Edison, which was install-
ing conduit for telecommunications purposes. 25 2 The claim of discrimi-
nation was apparently made in light of Cablevision's intent to expand
from cable into telecommunications service.253 In reviewing Cablevi-
sion's claim, the First Circuit ruled that the nondiscrimination require-
ment of section 253(c) applied only to compensation requirements, not
to right-of-way management.254 Hence, section 253 did not impose an
247. Hawarden, 590 N.W.2d at 508.
248. Id.
249. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. City of Orangeburg, 522 S.E.2d 804 (S.C. 1999) ("Gener-
ally, a tax is an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government, whereas a fee is a
charge for a particular benefit to the payer." Id. at 806).
250. In Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. City of Hawthorne, the court concluded that the Tax
Injunction Act did not apply to right-of-way fees because such fees were not taxes. However, the
court appeared to believe that the alternative was for these charges to be "regulatory fees," ignor-
ing the category of rents. 188 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
An Illinois state court in 2001 concluded that the state's "infrastructure maintenance fee"
(IMF), which was implemented in 1998 to take the place of local franchise fees, represented
compensation for use of the public rights-of-way rather than a tax. Primeco Personal Communica-
tions, L.P. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 750 N.E.2d 202, 212 (111. 2001), reh'g denied, 748
N.E.2d 195 (I11. 2001). The court concluded, however, that wireless providers were not subject
to the IMF because they did not use (physically occupy) the public rights-of-way. Id.
251. See Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub. Improvement Comm'n of Boston, 184 F.3d 88
(1st Cir. 1999).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 90.
254. Id. at 100.
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affirmative obligation on local governments to "ensure a level playing
field among telecommunications providers. ' 25 1 Moreover, while fees
were not specifically in question, the court did point out that sec-
tion 253 preserved local governments' authority "to manage and de-
mand compensation for the use of their rights of way. 226 Although nei-
ther compensation nor property rights were directly at issue in that case,
the court allowed for the property-rights approach by recognizing that
section 253 preserves local rights to both compensation and manage-
ment.
In Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey,21 7 a court again denied a preliminary injunction re-
quested by a telecommunications provider, holding that requirements
imposed on the use by a wireless carrier of public rights-of-way in
tunnels did not appear to violate either section 253 or section 332.28
The court, citing the seminal Western Union case, noted that "com-
pensation," as the term is used in section 253(c), has long been under-
stood to include rental fees for public property appropriated to private
commercial uses, not merely costs.
259
While not strictly dealing with rights-of-way, a state court in
Sunset Hills, Missouri, held that a business license tax on telecommu-
nications antennas did not violate section 253.260 On the other hand, a
federal district court in Pennsylvania held that a right-of-way ordi-
nance did extend beyond the protections of section 253(c) and consti-
tuted a barrier to entry261 on several grounds: the requirements of the
ordinance were unduly "broad and vague"; they extended beyond the
mere regulation of the public rights-of-way"; the compensation re-
quirements were not likely to be directly related to use of the rights-
of-way; and, the ordinance allowed the local government "apparently
limitless discretion" to grant or deny a franchise.262 The degree of dis-
255. Id. at 104.
256. Id. at 98.
257. 1999 WL 494120 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1999).
258. Id. at *7.
259. Id. at *6 (citing Western Union, 148 U.S. at 99). In this connection the OVS appeal
decision cited above should also be noted, as it too holds that local communities can charge fees
in the nature of rent for the use of their public rights-of-way. See supra note 205. See also City
of Dallas v. FCC, 118 F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1997) (franchise fees are in the nature of rent paid
by the cable operator and thus are not excluded from the gross revenues on which franchise fees
themselves are calculated).
260. City of Sunset Hills v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 14 S.W.3d 54 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1999).
261. PECO Energy Co. v. Township of Haverford, 1999 WL 1240941 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20,
1999).
262. Id. at **6-7.
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cretion left open by the ordinance appeared to be central in the court's
decision.
263
A 1999 Ninth Circuit decision focused on section 253(b) rather
than section 253(c), but it is significant for its general comments on
preemption.264 The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
penalized a telecommunications carrier for "slamming" long-distance
customers by imposing a three-year prohibition on the carrier's provi-
sion of intrastate long-distance services in California.265 The carrier
claimed that this prohibition violated section 253.266 In the course of
rejecting the claim, the Ninth Circuit observed that "[t]he United
States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have held that federal
preemption of state regulation in the area of telecommunications must
be clear and [occur] only in limited circumstances. ' 267 The court also
noted that in this case preemption would affect an important state in-
terest in regulating utilities.268 Since such utility regulation normally
occurs at the state PUC level, however, it is rare that this particular
issue will be relevant in local government actions under section 253.
These early section 253 cases established the beginning of a split
between courts that recognized local property rights and those that
bypassed property rights in favor of other issues, such as PUC-like
regulation or discretion to deny entry.
3. The Sixth Circuit's Dearborn Decision
The year 2000 saw another Circuit Court of Appeals take the
field. The Sixth Circuit, much more explicitly than the First, essen-
tially upheld the concept of a telecommunications franchise for use of
269a local community's property.
Two years earlier, the city of Dearborn, Michigan, won summary
judgment at the trial court level against TCG Detroit, a telecommuni-
cations provider, in the company's challenge to the City's right-of-way
263. The PECO court depended heavily on the initial trial court decision in Bell Atlantic-
Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Md. 1999) vacated by 212 F.3d
863 (4th Cir. 2000), which sounded this same theme of suspicion as to local community discre-
tion. PECO, 1999 WL 1240941, at **7-8. A consistent approach that denied all discretion to
local communities would, however, be contrary to the constitutional value of federalism.
264. Communications Telesystems Int'l v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 196 F.3d 1011 (9th
Cir. 1999).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1014.
267. Id. at 1017.
268. Id.
269. TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter
Dearborn II].
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ordinance.2 7' The Sixth Circuit's review upheld the district court's
decision and vindicated the City's franchise requirement.2 71  As the
court pointed out, TCG's claim that the City's requirement of a fran-
chise fee was itself a barrier to entry was "sophistry. "272 "The pro-
vider must apply for a franchise; the City assesses a franchise fee; no
fee paid, no franchise given. That cannot 'be described as a prohibi-
tion [within the meaning of section 253(a)]."'273 The question under
section 253, then, was whether the fee was "fair and reasonable" so as
to bring the requirement within the safe harbor of section 253(c).274
The Sixth Circuit upheld the trial court's finding that the City's
franchise fee of four percent of gross revenues was fair and reasonable
for purposes of section 253.27 The two courts based this conclusion
on "the amount of use contemplated (twenty-seven miles), the amount
that other providers would be willing to pay (three others had agreed
to similar fees), and the fact that TCG had agreed in earlier negotia-
tions to a fee almost identical to what it was now challenging as un-
fair. '276 Thus, while the Sixth Circuit considered compensation re-
lated to usage, it did not jump to the conclusion that this meant the
costs imposed by usage.277 Moreover, citing what other providers (and
TCG itself) had agreed to immediately placed the matter in a market
context, where actual transactions establish a measure of value.
2 78
A further insight into the nondiscrimination language of sec-
tion 253 emerged from the fact that the trial court found, and the Sixth
Circuit agreed, that under Michigan law the incumbent local exchange
carrier, Ameritech, was immune from such a franchise fee.279 The
courts found that Michigan had granted Ameritech a statewide fran-
chise and as a result, the City could manage its public rights-of-way,
but not impose franchise fees. 280 The City retained regulatory powers,
but not the compensation rights of an owner.281 TCG claimed that if
Ameritech were not required to pay, the resulting disparity of pay-
270. TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785 (E.D. Mich. 1998) [hereinafter
Dearborn I].
271. Dearborn II, 206 F.3d at 626.
272. Id. at 624.
273. Id. See also Dearborn 1, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 793 ("The City is not prohibiting the TCG
from entry, rather, TCG has chosen not to pay for its access.").
274. Dearborn II, 206 F.3d at 624.




279. Id. at 626.
280. Dearborn 1,16 F. Supp. 2d at 794.
281. Id.
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ment would constitute "discrimination" under section 253(c).282 The
appeals court found, however, as had the trial court before it, that this
state-granted vested right held by Ameritech did not render the fee as
applied to TCG discriminatory for purposes of section 253(c). 213 If
Ameritech had received a grant of authority to use the public rights-
of-way from the state, and state law prohibited the City from charging
Ameritech the same price as TCG, this did not mean the City was
discriminating.2"4 As the trial court had noted, the legislative history
of section 253 explicitly rejected the proposition that all comers must
be charged exactly the same fees.2"5 Thus, TCG, which had not made
the same century-old deal with the State, could not use Ameritech's
prior rights as leverage to force the city to allow use of its property for
free by all comers.286
4. The Grant County Decision
A federal district court in New Mexico cited Dearborn for the
central proposition that a community could charge a reasonable fee for
right-of-way use, but reached a different result as to how the fee could
be calculated. 27 Here the court found that a "process for entry" in-
volving "burdensome" application requirements under a telecommu-
nications ordinance adopted by Grant County could have the effect of
prohibiting entry under section 253(a) and exceeding the scope of
right-of-way management under section 253(c).288 Citing Dearborn,
the court recognized that a fair and reasonable franchise fee does not
constitute a section 253(a) prohibition,28 9 yet it opined (contrary to the
Dearborn decision) that a fee based on a percentage of gross revenues
was not sufficiently related to physical use of the rights-of-way, or to
282. Id. at 791.
283. Dearborn II, 206 F.3d at 625.
284. Id.
285. Dearborn 1, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
286. Three state proceedings followed, addressing the city's compensation and other rights
under state law once it was clear that § 253 did not preempt such rights. An initial decision at the
trial court level, TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, No. 98-803937-CK (Cir. Ct. of Wayne
County, Mich.), was appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals (No. 232609). The Michigan
Public Service Commission also issued a decision under the title MFN v. City of Dearborn, No.
U-12797; that decision is also on appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals (No. 236722). In
addition, in September 2002 the Michigan Supreme Court declined to respond to a related
certified question regarding the constitutionality of the telecommunications right-of-way
legislation passed by the Michigan legislature in the spring of 2002, leaving the matter to be
"resolved in the traditional manner." In re 2002 PA 48, 652 N.W.2d 667, 667 (Mich. 2002).
287. Board of County Comm'rs of Grant County, N.M. v. US West Communications,
Inc., No. Civ. 98-1354 JC/LCS (D.N.M. June 26, 2000) (Memorandum Opinion and Order
(Doc. 66)).
288. Id., slip op. at 8-11.
289. Id.
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the County's expenses in managing the rights-of-way, to fall within
the protection of section 253(c).29 ° As a result, the court preempted
the affected parts of the County's ordinance, but in this case severed
other sections that were preserved as lawful.29'
The Grant County focus on application process suggests an ap-
proach that is regulatory rather than property-oriented. Even in
evaluating other property issues, such as a lease, the central issue tends
to be price, rather than how to fill out the application form. One cor-
ollary to this phenomenon is that extensive application requirements
may divert a court from the issue of using a community's property to
considering the case instead in terms of "access" and "entry." That
sort of language is not typically used in a rental context because it is
assumed that the terms and conditions of "access to the property"
(i.e., the lease), most notably the price, will be worked out in negotia-
tions between the parties. Thus, it appears that a court preoccupied
with the application process may never get back to the standpoint of
considering whether a telecommunications provider has a right to "ac-
cess" the community's property for free. Rather, the court may come
to take for granted that the community's requirements constitute a set
of "barriers to entry" and that the price should be treated as just one
more potential barrier. A similar pattern can be seen in several of the
cases discussed below.
5. The Silver Star Appeal
Another year 2000 appeals court decision addressed section 253
preemption, but not local government rights-of-way.292 Silver Star
Telephone Co., Inc., 93 like the Hyperion case in Tennessee, 9" involved
a law allowing small incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to ex-
clude competition. The law was viewed as a transitional measure to
smooth the change to a competitive market. 296 The FCC ruled that
this law created an obvious barrier to market entry and therefore was
subject to federal preemption under section 253. 297 The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the FCC's order in RT Communications, Inc. 298 The court
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. RT Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2000).
293. In re Silver Star Tel. Co., Petition for Preemption and Declaratory Ruling, 12
F.C.C.R. 15639 (1997), recons. denied, 13 F.C.C.R. 16356 (1998).
294. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
295. Silver Star, 13 F.C.C.R. at 15646. This case arose in Wyoming, and involved ILECs
serving 30,000 or fewer access lines.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 15657.
298. RT Communications, 201 F.3d at 1266.
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gave Chevron deference to the FCC's judgment in the matter,299 hold-
ing that the prohibition on competitive entry under section 253(a) was
not saved by the state law safe harbor in section 253(b) because it was
not competitively neutral."' Like the FCC, the court rejected the no-
tion that a statute was neutral as long as it treated all new carriers in
the same way.0 While the Tenth Circuit appears to have viewed this
result as consistent with the First Circuit's position on competitive
neutrality in Cablevision of Boston, it is clear that there is a developing
tension as to how that clause should be handled in dealing with ILECs
and competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs).
For purposes of this analysis, cases such as Silver Star form a
useful illustration of an actual "barrier to entry" in the true sense of
the term-a legal prohibition-as opposed to price and other terms
that may be viewed by some as "barriers" in a much less stringent
sense because they may be simply considered onerous or bothersome.
6. The Chattanooga State Law Action
The developing process for how to bring cases that fall within the
1996 Act is also reflected in another 2000 decision.0 2 On February 6,
1996, the City of Chattanooga passed a telecommunications ordinance
including a five percent franchise fee.303 The City filed a declaratory
judgment action in state court, naming as defendants various tele-
communications providers and seeking to have the court declare the
rights of the parties.30 4 The case was removed to federal court on di-
versity grounds.30 ' The federal court's initial decision leaped the logi-
cal gap from "reasonable compensation" to "costs" noted with respect
to Hawarden,16 and it concluded that the franchise fee must be a tax
because it resulted in revenues unrelated to costs.30 7 The court then
struck down the ordinance on the ground that under Tennessee state
law, only the state, not cities, could tax telecommunications services.30 8
The City, however, pointed out that under the Tax Injunction Act,3" 9
299. Id. at 1268.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. City of Chattanooga v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 2000 WL 122199, at *1 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2000) [hereinafter Chattanooga II].
303. Id. at*1.
304. Id.
305. City of Chattanooga v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 1 F. Supp. 2d 809, 811 (E.D.
Tenn. 1998) [hereinafter Chattanooga I].
306. See supra notes 244-248 and accompanying text.
307. Chattanooga 1, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 814.
308. City of Chattanooga v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17458
(E.D. Tenn. 1997) (motion on summary judgment).
309. Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2002).
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a federal court was the wrong place to address a state tax challenge. 1 °
The federal district court, after repeating its argument that the ordi-
nance represented a tax, agreed that it did not have subject matter ju-
risdiction, vacated its earlier order, and remanded the case to Tennes-
see state court.31'
The state court's subsequent decision took note of a central dis-
tinction between two roles a local government may play with respect
to a right-of-way user: that of an owner or landlord, and that of a gov-
ernmental regulator.312
The state court then held, however, that the Chattanooga ordi-
nance could not be a proprietary function, but must be governmental
(i.e., regulatory), because two of the defendants already held prior
franchises granted to their predecessors, and the City could not, under
its proprietary function, revoke or impair rights previously granted.313
Since the franchise fee also could not be a tax, the court concluded that
it must be an exercise of police powers, and that a right-of-way charge
imposed under police powers must "bear a reasonable relation" to the
use of the public rights-of-way. 34 The court did acknowledge that the
costs of right-of-way use extended beyond the mere repair of the street
and could include the added costs of more frequent repaving required
by street cuts. 31 5  But it struck down the five percent fee on the
grounds that the City had not shown any relationship between that
gross revenues-based fee and any of its costs."' Thus, in Chattanooga
the initial error of regarding a revenue-based fee as ipsofacto a tax gave
rise to a series of errors ending in an inappropriate focus on costs.
7. Minimal Requirements in the Mobile Decision
A number of section 253 decisions emerged in the early part of
2001. One such case, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of
Mobile,3"7 essentially marks one end on a spectrum of possible out-
comes by upholding a city telecommunications permit ordinance
310. Chattanooga I, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 812.
311. Id.at815-16.
312. "A municipality has authority to act in either its proprietary capacity or its govern-
mental capacity.... Acting in its proprietary capacity, a municipality may exact a charge for the
use of its rights-of-way unrelated to the cost of maintaining its rights-of-way, but in its govern-
mental capacity, it may only act through an exercise of its police power to regulate specific activ-
ity or to defray the cost of providing services or benefit to the party paying the fee." Chattanooga
II, 2000 WL 122199, at *1.
313. Id.
314. Id. at *2.
315. Id. at*3.
316. Id. at *4.
317. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Mobile, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (S.D. Ala. Mar.
30, 2001).
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against a challenge under section 253. 318 Here, the City's permitting
ordinance required only fees explicitly covering administrative costs.
319
Moreover, its regulatory provisions were confined to quintessential
right-of-way management issues.32 As noted above in discussing
Hawarden,321 however, such fees do not begin to recover the entire
value of the public rights-of-way.322  Despite the cases described
above, Mobile indicates that right-of-way management provisions
needed to protect the community's interests do not conflict with sec-
tion 253.323
Although compensation issues were minimal (the only fees in-
volved were administrative), the court did acknowledge the dual inter-
ests of the City in its public rights-of-way.324 Against a property
rights claim by BellSouth, the court upheld the City's governmental
right-of-way management authority. 325 But the court also rejected
BellSouth's property claim on the ground that the streets were the
City's property.126 Thus, the Mobile court upheld the city's rights, al-
beit primarily noncompensation rights, while keeping the City's prop-
erty interest in view.
8. Denver v. Qwest
A state court decision in early 2001 dealt with the City of Den-
ver's telecommunications ordinance as a matter of Colorado state
law.3 27 The Colorado Supreme Court upheld a 1996 state law giving
telecommunications providers the right to use public rights-of-way
without compensation to local governments, although technical con-
sent by the local community could be required. 2' A challenge was
raised based on anti-donation principles.3 29 The court concluded that
the state law did not constitute a giveaway of public property to pri-
vate corporations because it furthered public purposes such as encour-
aging competition and ensuring benefits to consumers. 3 ' The court
318. Id. at 1272.
319. Id. at 1264.
320. Id. at 1264, 1270.
321. See supra notes 244-248 and accompanying text.
322. Id.
323. City of Mobile, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
324. Id. at 1276.
325. "BellSouth's use of the City's rights-of-way is subject to the continuing authority of
the City to manage its rights-of-way in the exercise of its police powers." Id.
326. "The Ordinance relates to the use of the City's property, the public streets and rights-
of-way, and not BellSouth's own private property." Id.
327. City and County of Denver v. Qwest Corp., 18 P.3d 748 (Colo. 2001).
328. Id. at 751.
329. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
330. Denver, 18 P.3d at 758-59.
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rejected the City's argument that section 253 preempted the state law
(although it also noted that the trial court below had held the City's
ordinance was not preempted by the federal Act).33' While the court
here suggested that the City held the public rights-of-way in its gov-
ernmental capacity, unlike the court in Chattanooga, it held the City
was not entitled to compensation.
332
The Denver court's defense of the legislature's right to give away
public property to private entities appears to prove far too much. All
private companies compete in a non-monopoly market, and all provide
some sort of benefit to consumers by virtue of the fact that they can
sell their products or services. If simply helping out private compa-
nies is seen as sufficient justification for donations of public property,
it is difficult to conceive of a gift to a private entity that would not
qualify.
9. The New Jersey Payphone Decision
A somewhat different sort of issue arose in New Jersey Payphone
Association, Inc. v. Town of West New York.333 The Town of West
New York invited bids from private companies to provide pay tele-
phones within the Town.334 The Town's action was challenged by an
association of pay telephone providers.33 The court addressed the
challenge on the basis of section 253 preemption, disagreeing with the
Fourth Circuit's requirement that state law issues be addressed before
reaching federal issues (as in the Prince George's County case discussed
below).336 Because the Town's bidding procedure for the payphone
contracts apparently contemplated an exclusive agreement with a sin-
gle provider in a given area, the court concluded that the ordinance
was a barrier to entry.337 In dicta, the court went on to question
whether a process that evaluated bidders based on the fees they were
willing to pay would yield "fair and reasonable compensation," sug-
gesting that any "fee that does more than make a municipality whole is
not compensatory in the literal sense, and risks becoming an economic
barrier to entry. "338
331. Id. at 759.
332. Id. at 761.
333. 130 F. Supp. 2d 631 (D. N.J. 2001).
334. Id. at 632.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 635.
337. Id. at 636.
338. Id. at 638. It appears that this court's position on compensation may result in part
from the court's opinion that under New Jersey law a town does not own the land under the pub-
lic streets in fee simple, but rather has only an easement in the property. Id.
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This decision should be read with skepticism as to the applicabil-
ity of its rationale in other matters. The court here was dealing with a
specific New Jersey statute that it believed limited the compensation
available.339 Also, the court interpreted section 253(c) as an affirma-
tive restriction on local authority, rather than a safe harbor.3 4' That
position, however, has not survived in the appellate courts.34'
10. The Auburn Decision and Its Ninth Circuit Progeny
In the wake of the First and Sixth Circuit decisions described
above, the Ninth Circuit struck a distinctly discordant note in City of
Auburn v. Qwest Corporation.3 42 The Auburn case arose out of an issue
relating to the cost of facility relocation made necessary by right-of-
way improvements, but expanded to involve section 253 issues when
Qwest claimed that right-of-way ordinances passed by a number of
Washington cities were preempted by federal law.
The Ninth Circuit's original opinion began from the premise
that section 253's preemption was "virtually absolute"-apparently
with respect to "telecommunications regulation.343  Thus, from the
beginning, the opinion interpreted telecommunications franchising as
a matter of regulation rather than in terms of property rights.3 44 The
opinion assumed without discussion (and without reference to the
contrary precedent cited above) that franchise fees must be based on
costs. 345 As in Austin, White Plains,3 46 and Grant County, the court fo-
cused on the Cities' detailed application requirements and the fact that
they retained discretion to refuse use of the public rights-of-way to an
applicant.347 According to the original opinion (later revised, as noted
below), "each of these requirements" had the effect of prohibiting en-
try. 348 The court then concluded that various requirements-such as
financial, legal, and technical qualifications for holding a franchise-
regulated the companies themselves because they did not directly relate
to right-of-way management.3 49 The fact that such requirements indi-
339. "Certain local government fees, taxes, levies, or assessments prohibited" at N.J. REV.
STAT. § 54:30A-124 (2002).
340. Id. at 649.
341. See, e.g., infra Section V.B.12 (the Palm Beach case).
342. 247 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1079 (2002).
343. Id. at 980 (emphasis added).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 981.
346. For discussion of White Plains, see infra Section VB. 19.
347. Auburn, 247 F.3d at 981.
348. Id. (emphasis added).
349. Id. at 984-85.
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rectly related to the use of the public rights-of-way was brushed aside
by the court as "too tenuous a connection. "310
In July 2001, after a motion for rehearing, the Ninth Circuit
amended eight passages in its opinion in such a way as to hedge some
of the more sweeping claims in the original.3"' Most notably, the
amended opinion avoided claiming that each requirement formed a
barrier to entry and restricted that claim to the effect of the require-
ments taken together.352 It also acknowledged that a franchise re-
quirement per se is not preempted by the 1996 Act, and added a foot-
note reference to Dearborn, precedent conspicuously absent from the
original opinion.353 However, the court denied the petition for rehear-
ing, without explanation.35 4
Significantly, more recent district court decisions in the Ninth
Circuit have applied Auburn narrowly, in such a way as not to pre-
clude revenue-based right-of-way fees, where a telecommunications
provider has not shown that such fees have the effect of prohibiting
service. In July 2001, Qwest brought an action against the City of
Portland challenging that City's telecommunications ordinance and
right-of-way fee.3"' On March 22, 2002, Magistrate Judge Jelderks,
sitting in the U.S. District Court in Portland, ordered Qwest to re-
sume paying a percentage of its gross receipts to Oregon cities as com-
pensation for its use of their rights-of-way. 56 Qwest had stopped pay-
ing such fees after the Ninth Circuit's decision in the Auburn case.357
The court pointed out that Qwest had failed to prove that the fees had
the effect of prohibiting Qwest from providing telecommunications
services, stating concisely: "If the challenged requirements do not
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of an entity to
provide a telecommunications service, section 253 does not preempt
the requirements and the court's inquiry is complete.
35 1
Judge Jelderks's opinion correctly notes the obvious, but fre-
quently ignored, fact that "[s]ection 253 does not address revenue-
350. Id. at 985. It should be noted that the issue of fees was not strictly before the court at
all in Auburn (hence the court's references to fees are dicta). Washington State replaces the col-
lection of rents by local governments with a 6% gross receipts tax, which was not at issue in this
case. See id. at n.il.
351. City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. July 2001) (amended deci-
sion).
352. Id. at 1165 (Amendment No. 5).
353. Id. (Amendment Nos. 5 and 6).
354. Id.
355. Qwest Corp. v. City of Portland, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1255-56 (D. Or. 2002).
356. Id. at 1254.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 1255-56.
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based fees, much less categorically forbid them."3 9 As a result, the
court arrives at an analysis of section 253 parallel to that of the prop-
erty-rights model as discussed in Part II of this Article: section 253
preempts right-of-way fees only if they would effectively prohibit pro-
vision of a telecommunications service, and even then such fees are not
preempted by section 253(c) if they qualify as fair and reasonable
compensation for use of the rights-of-way g.3 " The Portland decision
also upheld the cities' insistence on the providers' submittal of finan-
cial and other information necessary to the cities' administration of
their right-of-way ordinances, distinguishing the cities' requirements
from those struck down in Auburn, on the grounds that these fran-
chises and ordinances did not give the cities "unfettered discretion" to
deny entry.361
This gradual clarification in understanding section 253 in the
Western courts is visible in the sequence of decisions in the Berkeley
case. 362 Relying heavily on the original Auburn decision, a federal dis-
trict court in California issued an order on May 23, 2001, granting a
preliminary injunction against another local telecommunications ordi-
nance.363 Five months later, the court conducted a detailed discussion
of the legislative history of section 253 and concluded that there was
no private right of action directly under section 253.364 An affected
telecommunications company must instead bring a challenge under
the Supremacy Clause.36" The court noted, however, that the remedy
available under the Supremacy Clause was preemption, not the dam-
ages and attorney fees that a company might seek under section 253
itself.366 Then, at the end of April 2002, the court accepted the basic
reasoning in Portland when it denied Qwest's motion for judgment on
the pleadings.367 Because Qwest had to show that an ordinance pro-
359. Id. at 1256.
360. Id. (emphasis added).
361. Id. Qwest appealed the Portland decision to the Ninth Circuit on May 8, 2002
(Docket No. 02-35473).
362. Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Cal.
2001) (Order Granting Preliminary Injunction).
363. Id. at 1087. In that decision, however, the district court also correctly held among
other things that neither cost recovery fees, nor annual rent charges that do not relate to costs,
constitute taxes (though in the end it did not determine the lawfulness of either type of charge).
Id. at 1092-93.
364. Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of Berkely, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1096 (N.D.
Cal. 2001) (Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Claim for Relief).
365. Id. at 1096.
366. Id.
367. Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of Berkely, 208 F.R.D. 288 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(Order Denying Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and Denying Motion for Temporary
Stay of Discovery).
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hibits, or has the effect of prohibiting, service even to make an initial
case under section 253(a), the court concluded that it could not decide
the matter on the pleadings without the opportunity for a "fact-based
inquiry. '368 Citing Portland, the court ruled that "Qwest must present
evidence to establish the effect of the Ordinances. 3 69  Thus, the
Berkeley court's analysis of section 253 appears to be moving toward a
sound understanding of how to apply that section.
3 71
11. The Bristol Decision on Municipal Entry
In City of Bristol v. Earley,371 Judge James P. Jones held that the
plain language of section 253(a) of the 1996 Act includes cities among
those "entities" whose right to entry is protected by the Act.372 As a
result, he held that federal law preempted a Virginia statute forbidding
municipal entry.373 This decision was appealed to the Fourth Circuit,
but the appeal was dismissed on May 1, 2002, after the Virginia legis-
lature relaxed the statutory prohibition.374 Compensation for right-of-
way use was not involved in this case.
12. Palm Beach and Coral Springs
In May 2001, a fourth federal circuit, the Eleventh, entered the
fray.375 Applying a Florida law (which had actually changed twice
since the original cases were filed), the court found that the Cities'
franchise and license fees for telecommunications companies were con-
trolled by state law, and hence did not reach the question of their
status under section 253.376 It did, however, review BellSouth's federal
368. Id. at 294.
369. Id. at 295.
370. Another Ninth Circuit district court decision appears to be inconclusive as to substan-
tive results concerning § 253. Qwest Corp. v. City of Globe, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (D. Ariz.
Aug. 15, 2002).
371. City of Bristol v. Earley, 145 F. Supp. 2d 741 (W.D. Va. 2001).
372. Id. at 747.
373. Id.
374. Appeal Dismissed as Moot, City of Bristol, Virginia v. Virginia Telecomm., No. 01-
1741 (4th Cir. May 1, 2002). Judge Jones later concluded that in Virginia, a Dillon Rule state,
the state had not explicitly granted cities the power to provide cable service, and thus Bristol's
system could not offer cable service without further legislative action. Marcus Cable Assoc. v.
City of Bristol, 237 F. Supp. 2d 675, 681 (W.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2002).
375. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2001).
BellSouth brought suit against telecommunications ordinances adopted by two Florida munici-
palities: the City of Coral Springs and the Town of Palm Beach. Id. at 1175. The trial courts
reached mixed results, and review on appeal was consolidated by the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at
1176.
376. Id. at 1183-85.
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preemption claims for other provisions of the ordinances that it found
were not preempted by state law.
377
The court's crucial holding on section 253 was to recognize the
structure of review required by the subsections of section 253.37 Sub-
sections (b) and (c) do not impose affirmative substantive require-
ments on localities; rather, they serve only as safe harbors preserving
certain legal requirements from the affirmative requirements of sec-
tion 253(a).379 Thus, for example, the nondiscrimination requirement
of section 253(c) is not even relevant unless a requirement has the
force of a barrier to entry under section 253(a), making it necessary to
determine whether it is exempted by the section 253(c) safe harbor.
Among other things, the opinion noted that the FCC itself, in 1998
guidelines for filing petitions under section 253, acknowledged this
structure.8 ° It also recognized that the purpose of subsection (d) is to
direct disputes potentially implicating section 253(c) to the courts, not
the FCC.3 81 Because the trial court decisions dealt with section 253(c)
without ever determining whether the ordinances in question violated
section 253(a), the Eleventh Circuit remanded to the courts below to
determine (1) whether any of the provisions in question violated sec-
tion 253(a), and (2) if so, whether the provisions were nonetheless
saved under section 253(c).38 2 Thus, before an ordinance can be con-
sidered preempted, a court must conduct both the section 253(a) and
the section 253(c) analyses.
13. The Prince George's County Decisions
In July 2001, a federal district court in Maryland issued the final
ruling in a proceeding with a somewhat checkered procedural his-
tory. 3  Prince George's County, Maryland, adopted an ordinance
imposing a three percent gross revenue fee on all telecommunications
companies operating through facilities in the rights-of-way.3 4 Bell
Atlantic (now Verizon) sued to enjoin the ordinance.
377. Id. at 1185-86.
378. Id. at 1191. See also supra Section I.A.
379. PalmBeach, 252 F.3d at 1187.
380. Id. at 1188 (Suggested Guidelines for Petitions for Ruling under § 253 of the Commu-
nications Act, available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common Carrier/Public-Notices/
1998/fcc98295.txt).
381. Id. at 1191.
382. Id. at 1192.
383. Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 155 F. Supp. 2d 465 (D. Md.
2001) [hereinafter Prince George's County III].
384. Id. at 469.
385. Id. at 466.
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In its initial decision in 1999, the district court avoided address-
ing Verizon's federal constitutional and state law claims and moved
directly to section 253.386 Judge Blake held that the County "certainly
is permitted under the FTA [the 1996 Act] to require ... a County-
issued franchise. '317 However, she ruled that the franchise fee "must
be directly related to companies' use of their local rights-of-way, oth-
erwise the fees constitute an unlawful economic barrier to entry under
§ 253(a)."3 ' The "appropriate benchmark is not the 'value' of Bell
Atlantic's 'privilege' of using the County's public rights-of-way ....
Rather, the proper benchmark is the cost to the County of maintaining
and improving the public rights-of-way .... [T]hese costs must be
apportioned to Bell Atlantic based on its degree of use, not its overall
level of profitability.""3 9  Furthermore, the district court defined
"use" as "physical impact"-thus resellers and other non-facilities-
based providers could not be required to obtain a local franchise.39
Finally, the court held that the technical, financial, and legal informa-
tion required by the County to grant a franchise, coupled with the
County's discretion to not issue a franchise, created a barrier to entry
in violation of section 253(a) and exceeded the scope of the safe harbor
right-of-way management authority under section 253(c).39 The
court held that right-of-way management was limited to the types of
activities described by prior FCC decisions, such as regulation of traf-
fic flow, underground placement of facilities, and cost of street repair
and excavation.
392
This initial trial court decision, although later vacated on appeal,
has been extensively cited in industry briefs and subsequent case
law.393 Both sides appealed the decision.394 In 2000, the Fourth Circuit
vacated the district court decision and remanded with instruction back to
the district court.3 ' Reaffirming the duty of federal courts to avoid con-
stitutional questions if possible, the Fourth Circuit held that the district
court's determination that state law was preempted by federal law did
386. Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814 (D.
Md. 1999) [hereinafter Prince George's County I].
387. Id. at 816.
388. Id. at 817.
389. Id. at 818.
390. Id. at 819.
391. Id. at 817.
392. Id. at 815-16.
393. See, e.g., Auburn, 260 F.3d at 1175; Cablevision of Boston, 184 F.3d at 99.
394. Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir. 2000)
[hereinafter Prince George's County If].
395. Id.
[Vol. 26:475
2003] Property Rights, Federalism, and the Public Rights-of-Way 555
raise constitutional issues.396 The district court's failure to examine the
four state law claims raised by Bell Atlantic before it reached the federal
questions was thus reversible error.397 The Fourth Circuit revealed an
awareness of the fact that a federal law granting unfettered use of local
communities' property, free of charge, raises constitutional issues.
The trial judge's decision on remand again struck down the
County's ordinance in toto.398 The reasons given in the new opinion
closely paralleled the judge's earlier section 253 decision, but this time
rested on the grounds that Maryland public utilities law had given
exclusive jurisdiction to the Maryland Public Service Commission
over regulation of telecommunications companies.399 The conclusion
depended on the judge's continuing belief that the detailed application
requirements and other provisions of the County's ordinance had to
mean that the County was really regulating telecommunications ser-
vice, rather than use of its public rights-of-way.00
The final Prince George's County opinion did recognize the
County's right as a Maryland home rule county to grant franchises
and to manage its public rights-of-way.4 1 Its rationale for rejecting
the ordinance was that the ordinance, rather than doing these things,
was really "an attempt to regulate the telecommunications compa-
nies."4 2  The decision thus depended on the judge's analysis of the
ordinance as regulation rather than as a way to implement property
rights.
14. The City of Eugene Cases
A set of related decisions issued by an Oregon state court in late
2001 reflect a sounder understanding of section 253, in particular re-
garding revenue-based right-of-way fees.40 3 The City of Eugene, Ore-
396. Id. at 865.
397. Id. at 865-66.
398. Prince George's County III, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
399. Id. at 478.
400. The court made the following statement:
Thus, the question of preemption by state law depends on a characterization of the
ordinance. If the ordinance simply regulates the rights-of-way in the County, it
would follow that the ordinance was a valid exercise of County authority and not pre-
empted by Maryland law. Upon analysis, however, it appears that the ordinance-in
particular the application process and required submissions-exceed the scope of
mere right-of-way regulation.
Id. at 476.
401. Id. at 475-76.
402. Id. at 477.
403. AT&T Communications of the Pac. Northwest, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 35 P.3d 1029
(Or. Ct. App. 2001) [hereinafter Eugene I]; US West Communications, Inc. v. City of Eugene,
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gon, adopted an ordinance in 1997 requiring telecommunications pro-
viders operating in the City to pay an annual registration fee of two
percent of their gross revenues. Telecommunications facilities owners
(other than those grandfathered under existing agreements) were re-
quired to pay a licensing fee of seven percent of gross revenues.4 4 The
proceeds were kept in a separate subfund, to be used not only for ad-
ministrative costs but also for telecommunications -related construc-
tion projects. 41 5  AT&T, Sprint, Qwest, and TCI Communications
each asked the court to rule that the City's fees violated section 253
(along with other state law claims).40 6
The court upheld the City's fees in each of four separate cases,
and reversed a lower court decision striking down the fees. 407 AT&T
had argued that section 253 limits localities to recovering costs associ-
ated with use of the rights-of-way. 48 The court rejected that claim.4 9
In this case, the court did not engage in an explicit property rights
analysis, but apparently reached its conclusion based on the reasoning
in Dearborn, already discussed, focusing on the fact that a fee alone
was not a prohibition under section 253(a).410
The court also dismissed AT&T's argument that the City could
not establish licensing and regulation requirements and its claim that
localities are limited to right-of-way regulations. Under section 253,
local laws are valid absent a showing that a challenged regulation actu-
ally prohibits or has the effect of prohibiting entry. 411 The court found
that AT&T had not shown that the City's ordinance had the effect of
prohibiting service. 412  The court was not convinced by AT&T's
claims that such regulations provide a redundant third layer of regula-
tion that "will lead to a 'patchwork' of varying local regulations," find-
37 P.3d 1001 (Or. Ct. App. 2001); TCI Cablevision of Oregon, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 38 P.3d
269 (Or. Ct. App. 2001); Sprint Spectrum v. City of Eugene, 35 P.3d 327 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
404. Eugenel, 35 P.3d at 1033-34.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Its principal opinion was in AT&T Communications of the Pacific Northwest, Inc. v.
City of Eugene, 35 P.3d 1029. The court dealt with the additional actions more briefly in three
other opinions filed on the same date, October 31, 2001. See supra note 403. On August 7,
2002, the Oregon Supreme Court issued an order declining to review the AT&T, Sprint, and
TCI decisions. See Supreme Court of Oregon Petitions for Review, 52 P.3d 1056, 1056-57 (Or.
2002).
408. Eugene 1, 35 P.3d at 1043.
409. Id. at 1051.
410. Id. at 1045. The Eugene court did appear, erroneously, to confuse user fees with taxes.
See id. at 1035-36. However, it also distinguished taxes on subscribers from taxes on telephone
providers themselves, which are one step closer to user fees for the providers' use of the public
rights-of-way. Id. at 1038.
411. See, e.g., id. at 1044.
412. Id. at 1048.
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ing that such an argument "amounts to little more than speculation"
that is "buttressed by no evidence about the actual or likely effect of
the [C]ity's ordinance. ' 413 As a result, the court found that the City's
requirements did not rise to the level of a prohibition under sec-
tion 253(a), making it unnecessary to determine whether they fell
within the safe harbors of subsections (b) or (c).
414
15. The San Marcos Case
Preliminary results in a section 253 suit in California provide
some detailed, if idiosyncratic, examples of how a court may perceive
specific right-of-way conditions.415 The district court granted in part a
plaintiffs preliminary injunction,416 and simultaneously granted in
part the City's motion to dismiss in Cox Communications PCS v. City
of San Marcos.417  Here, Cox Communications, doing business as
Sprint PCS, sought to install three wireless sites in public rights-of-
way in the City of San Marcos.418 The City required Sprint to obtain a
conditional use permit first, and Sprint challenged this requirement.419
In the first decision, the court reviewed the City's requirements
one by one, upholding all but "three minor portions" of the ordinance,
two of which were objected to as reserving "unfettered discretion" to
the City.42 Those three were enjoined pending the court's review of
the case on the merits.42" ' In reviewing these provisions, the court cu-
riously seemed to conclude that the city lacked "the authority to pro-
tect the public safety and welfare," unless that power was delegated by
the state, but on the other hand concluded that the city could use a
zoning law or code to "prevent injury to property"422-hardly an intui-
tive result. In the second decision, reached on the same day, the court
dismissed several, but not all, of Sprint's claims on various grounds. 23
The court's emphasis on the burden of "a lengthy application proc-
413. Id.
414. Id. The court also rejected AT&T Wireless's claim of preemption under 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c)(3)(A). Id. at 1050.
415. See Cox Communications PCS v. City of San Marcos, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (S.D.
Cal. 2002) (Order Granting in Part, Denying in Part, Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion) [hereinafter Cox I]; Cox Communications PCS v. City of San Marcos, 204 F. Supp. 2d
1272 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (Order Granting in Part, Denying in Part, Defendant's Motion to Dis-
miss) [hereinafter Cox II].
416. Cox 1, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
417. Cox II, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1285.
418. Id. at 1274-75.
419. Id. at 1275.
420. Cox I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 1267.
423. Cox II, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1285.
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ess ' 424 places it in line with those tribunals that have focused on entry
procedures as a form of regulation, rather than on use of property.
16. Central Puget Sound
Several useful distinctions were made in Qwest Corporation v.
Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority.42 This decision up-
held the authority of the cities of Tacoma and Seattle to require reloca-
tion of Qwest's lines to accommodate a light rail system, at Qwest's
cost.42 6 The court classified this requirement as an exercise of the cit-
ies' police power and their authority to manage the public rights-of-
way, entirely distinct from compensation.427 Noting that Qwest was
already providing service within the two cities, the court stated, "[1]t is
clear that the relocation requirement does not constitute a 'barrier to
entry. '"'428 The court thus found that the relocation requirement did
not violate section 253(a), but even if it had, it would have been
shielded by section 253(c).429
17. Municipal Competition in the Missouri Municipal League
Decisions
As noted above, the FCC declined to apply section 253 to pre-
empt a Texas state law that erected an outright legal barrier to entry
by municipally owned utilities.43° Subsequently, the FCC denied a
similar petition on behalf of Missouri municipalities.4 3' The outcome
on appeal, however, was different in this case. 432 Following the rea-
soning of Bristol, the Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded the FCC's
decision not to preempt the Missouri barrier statute.433 Citing to a
long series of Supreme Court holdings that "any" (as in "any entity")
prevented a narrowing construction, the Eighth Circuit did not find the
D.C. Circuit's City of Abilene conclusion persuasive.
4 34
424. Cox I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
425. No. C02-155P (W.D. Wash. Aug. 6, 2002) (Order on Motions for Summary Judg-
ment).
426. Id., slip op. at 1.
427. Id. at 3.
428. Id. at 6.
429. Id. at 7.
430. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
431. In re Missouri Mun. League, Petition for Preemption of Section 392.410(7) of the Re-
vised Statutes of Missouri, 16 F.C.C.R. 1157 (2001).
432. Missouri Mun. League v. FCC, 299 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2002).
433. Id. at 955-56.
434. Id. at 955. The FCC has shown remarkable persistence in seeking to prevent the ap-
plication of § 253 in favor of municipal entities. Following the Eighth Circuit's decision on ap-
peal, the Commission petitioned for rehearing or rehearing en banc. The court denied that peti-
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18. Qwest v. Santa Fe
In Qwest v. Santa Fe,435 the court granted Qwest partial summary
judgment under a section 253(a) federal preemption claim, finding
that the ordinance in question allowed "essentially unfettered discre-
tion" to accept or reject applications based on vague and broad factors
such as "the public interest." '436 The court also found that the City's
combined requirements-a lease payment, the appraisal fee of the fa-
cilities to be used, a dedication to the City of the fiber deployed, and a
requirement for excess fiber deployment-would result in a "30 to
59%" increase in the costs to the carrier.437 Such an increase rose to the
level of a prohibition of entry under section 253(a).43 The court thus
appeared to be evaluating whether the charges were "fair and reason-
able" in some sense.4 9 It did not specifically refer to market value,
but it also avoided the common trap of confining compensation to
costs.
The court found that the City's ordinance did not violate section
253 by requiring permits and fees for access to the rights-of-way, as
state law had conferred that authority on the City."' The court also
held there was no private right of action available to Qwest under sec-
tion 253 of the Telecommunications Act or 42 U.S.C. section 1983;
41
Qwest's sole federal preemption claim lay under the Supremacy
Clause.442 The significance of this apparently technical distinction is
that it prevented Qwest from claiming attorneys' fees under sec-
tion 1983. 44 ' The court concluded in this respect that the administra-
tive remedies provided in the statute reflect "a carefully crafted bal-
ance between deregulating the telecommunications market at the
federal level and preserving state and local authority to regulate in cer-
tain prescribed areas. '""' To award attorneys' fees would upset the
balance that Congress sought to create in crafting section 253.
tion on October 22, 2002, then rescinded that denial pending correction of a procedural glitch.
Missouri Mun. League v. FCC, No. 01-1379 (8th Cir. Oct. 24, 2002).
435. Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (D. N.M. Aug. 30, 2002).
436. Id. at 1323-24.
437. Id. at 1324-25.
438. Id. at 1325.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 1327-28.
441. Id. at 1314,1316.
442. Id. at 1312.
443. Id. at 1315.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 1315-16.
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19. White Plains and Colonie
The Second Circuit faced the compensation issue arising from a
New York federal district court decision in 2000.446 White Plains I
held that burdensome application requirements plus a lengthy ap-
proval process could constitute a prohibition on entry triggering sec-
tion 253(a).4"7 Looking beyond the regulatory framework, however,
the court also held that fair and reasonable compensation extends be-
yond mere costs. 448 In fact, the court upheld compensation require-
ments reflecting at least two of the three categories of compensa-
tion 449 -a gross revenues fee and a fixed annual fee:
(a) five percent of gross revenues;
(b) a minimum annual fee starting at $5,000 and gradually in-
creasing to $10,000;
(c) reimbursement for the cost of third parties, including attor-
neys and consultants;
(d) an in-kind requirement for conduit constructed for the City
by TCG.450
The trial court held that the City did not discriminate by charg-
ing such fees to TCG and not to the incumbent LEC, Verizon (for-
merly known as Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, and New York Telephone)
because the latter had historically provided in-kind compensation in
the form of "an extensive underground conduit network throughout
the City" and other benefits.51
On appeal, the case was complicated by the FCC's filing of a
spontaneous amicus curiae brief.4 2 In a footnote to this brief, the
Commission's attorneys opined that a gross revenues-based fee might
be "problematic" under section 253(c). 4 3 The court asked the FCC to
make clear its views on the Commission's jurisdiction under sec-
tion 253 and on "fair and reasonable compensation" for use of the
446. TCG New York, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 125 F. Supp. 2d 81 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
[hereinafter White Plains I].
447. Id. at 89.
448. Id. at 96-98.
449. Identified supra Section II.C.
450. Id. at 95.
451. Id. at 99.
452. TCG New York, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 2002) [herein-
after White Plains II].
453. See Brief of the FCC and the United States as Amici Curiae, TCG New York, Inc. v.
City of White Plains, No. 01-7213(L), slip op. at 14 n.7 (2d Cir. June 12, 2001).
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public rights-of-way. 44 In a supplemental brief, the FCC took an ap-
propriately cautious view (in light of section 253(d)) of its own juris-
diction where there is an issue as to local communities' right to exer-
cise right-of-way management and require fair and reasonable
compensation pursuant to section 253(c).4"' Moreover, noting the
various open proceedings relating to the issue, the Commission de-
clined to take any position on the propriety of possible rights-of-way
charges beyond the text of its original footnote.
41 6
On September 12, 2002, the Second Circuit issued its decision.45 7
The appeals court upheld the initial decision finding a section 253(a)
violation in the City's application process and other factors.4"8 But, in
addition, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court with respect to
the franchise fee.459 It found this violation of section 253, however, for
the particular reason that the City's fee requirement had not been ap-plied to Verizon.4 6' The court found that Verizon's in-kind benefits to
the city were "sunk costs incurred in the past," and concluded that
they would not affect the cost burden on Verizon in the future.461' The
opinion disagreed with Dearborn about the consequences of a state law
immunizing the incumbent LEC from compensation requirements,
and held that section 253(c) could not save a compensation require-
ment "[w]here state laws and local ordinances combine to create a fee
that is not 'competitively neutral.' 462 The court does not seem to
have considered that the appropriate solution might have been to pre-
empt the alleged prior state grant to the incumbent, rather than to use
such an archaic grant as an opening wedge to give away local property
to other telecommunications companies. The court did, however,
emphasize that nondiscriminatory compensation requirements need
not be exactly equivalent, as long as a "rough parity between competi-
tors" is achieved.463
Most interesting, however, is the court's analysis of what "fair
and reasonable compensation" means under section 253(c). The opin-
ion addressed this question in terms that make clear the analogy to
other forms of property and payment:
454. Id.
455. See Supp. Brief of the FCC and the United States as Amici Curiae, TCG New York v.
City of White Plains, No. 01-7255(XAP) (2d Cir. Mar. 11, 2002).
456. Id. See White Plains II, 305 F.3d at 74-75.
457. White Plains II, 305 F.3d at 67.
458. Id. at 76-77.
459. Id. at 79-80.
460. Id. at 80.
461. Id. at 79.
462. Id. at 80.
463. Id.
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As ordinarily understood, "compensation" often extends to
more than costs. Thus, when we discuss wages and salary as
"compensation," see, e.g., I.R.C. § 61(a)(1), the term is not lim-
ited to costs. Similarly, discussing the payment of rent as "com-
pensation" for the use of property does not strain the ordinary
meanings of any of the words. And commercial rental agree-
ments commonly use gross revenue fees as part of the price
term.464
Observing that the word "compensation" is also sometimes used
to refer to costs, the Second Circuit noted the split between the Sixth
Circuit's Dearborn decision and the Ninth Circuit's dicta in Auburn. 6'
Having set the stage, however, the Second Circuit ultimately declined
to reach the question of whether section 253(c) would permit a gross
revenue fee.466 While the court appears to have recognized the impor-
tance of property rights in the context of section 253, its decision did
not turn on that analysis.
Two weeks later, a follow-up decision at the district court level
illuminated the import of White Plains.467 In Colonie, Judge Scullin
denied a motion by plaintiff TC Systems (another subsidiary, with
TCG, of AT&T) to dismiss a counterclaim by the Town of Colonie
that TC Systems used and occupied the Town's public rights-of-way
without a franchise.46 Beginning with New York law "requir[ing] a
telephone corporation to obtain a town's permission before using its
streets to install its facilities," '469 the court favorably quoted the Second
Circuit's language regarding the possibility that a gross revenues fee is
permissible under section 253.470 The court also found that because
the Colonie ordinance on its face applied to all carriers, including Ver-
izon, it was not discriminatory as a matter of law and thus was "factu-
ally distinct" from White Plains as understood by the Second Cir-
cuit.4 7 1  Judge Scullin cautioned that applying section 253 "isextremely fact sensitive. "472
464. Id. at 77.
465. Id. at 78. The court also noted that although compensation can sometimes be used as
a synonym for costs, the term "costs" itself here "can refer either to the actual out-of-pocket ex-
penses incurred or more broadly to the costs of capital and the 'opportunity cost' of forgone al-
ternative uses of resources." Id. at 77.
466. Id. at 79.
467. TC Systems, Inc. v. Town of Colonie, No. 1:00-CV-1972 (FJS/RFT) (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 2002) (Memorandum-Decision and Order) [hereinafter Colonie].
468. Id., slip op. at 10.
469. Id. at 4.
470. Id. at 8 n.5.
471. Id. at 9 n.6.
472. Id. at 8. Another district court decision in New York struck down a set of local tele-
communications franchise terms, comprehensively relying on references to White Plains but even
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20. Statewide Authority in the Maryland Heights Case
As noted above, one of the persistent complications in local
communities' attempts to deal with telecommunications providers on
a consistent basis is the unique historic position of the ILECs. The
incumbent's claim to have special rights granted by the state in the
distant past appeared, but was not addressed, in Prince George's
County, and played a role in Dearborn.
This issue surfaced again in an action brought by telecommuni-
cations carriers SBC and XO Missouri against the City of Maryland
Heights, Missouri.473 On September 23, 2002, a district court found
that the State of Missouri had "tendered an offer" by statute in 1879
to telegraph and telephone companies, and by accepting that offer,
SBC's predecessor had created a valid contract, whose consideration
was "establishing and maintaining adequate telecommunications ser-
vices which benefited [sic] the citizens of the State of Missouri. 4 74 In
light of this contract, the City could not impose the requirements of a
telecommunications ordinance on SBC, other than to specify certain
placements and alterations of facilities as provided in Missouri law.475
The second plaintiff, XO Missouri, however, had no such antediluvian
rights. The court cited Dearborn to the effect that nondiscrimination
need not imply identical treatment for the two providers.4 76 However, it
was not faced with the question of whether the differences involved
would constitute a barrier to entry, and declined to reach that point.
4 77
21. Summary: Judicial Results Depend on Acknowledgment of
Property Rights
Thus far, the ongoing interpretation of the 1996 Act by the
courts has resulted in a divergence of views among federal courts of
appeals that have dealt with section 253. In particular, since the Au-
burn decision there is a distinct conflict among the circuits with respect
more to Auburn. Without actually conducting a substantive analysis of whether any of the provi-
sions at issue in fact prohibited or had the effect of prohibiting service, Judge Hurd in City of
Rome v. Verizon Communications, Inc., No. 02-CV-0748 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2003), concluded that
franchise terms dealing with matters such as customer service, universal service, transfers, compli-
ance with other laws, fraud or bankruptcy, and even removal or relocation of facilities (a quintessen-
tial right-of-way management issue) all fell outside the sphere of right-of-way management and
compensation protected by § 253(c). Rome, slip op. at 7-10. Because he disposed of the case on
those grounds, the judge did not reach the compensation issue. Id. at 10 n.2.
473. XO Missouri, Inc. v. City of Maryland Heights, No. 4:99-CV-1052 CEJ (E.D. Mo.
Sept. 23, 2002) (Memorandum and Order).
474. Id., slip op. at 8.
475. Id. at 9 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 888 (1879)).
476. Id. at 18-19.
477. Id. at 19.
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to compensation. The Sixth, Second, and First Circuits47 have recog-
nized that "fair and reasonable compensation" under section 253 re-
flects the market value of local communities' property. By contrast,
the Ninth Circuit479 appears to have been seduced by the logically un-
founded notion that compensation for local governments must only
cover costs. 480 Thus, it seems likely that the Supreme Court may
eventually take up this issue to resolve the conflict among the circuits.
As suggested at the outset, the cases appear to fall into a pattern
indicating courts may misinterpret section 253 (as it was explicated
above in terms of the legislative history) if they fail to think of it in
terms of preserving local communities' property rights. In Dearborn,
as well as Dallas, Omnipoint, Mobile, and Portland, an analysis sensi-
tive to such property rights led to a favorable result with respect to lo-
cal communities' right to compensation for right-of-way use.481 Con-
versely, in Auburn, as well as Austin, Hawarden, PECO, Grant County,
Chattanooga, Prince George's County, San Marcos, and Rome, the
courts essentially ignored property issues and reached negative results
with regard to local rights and compensation."' Thus, it is significant
whether a court or other decision maker starts from a "regulation"
standpoint or from a "property rights" standpoint in approaching a
section 2 53 case.
VI. CONCLUSION
The survey of court decisions leads to the conclusion that the
outcome of a section 253 case depends a great deal on whether the
court acknowledges the role of a local community's property rights
over the public rights-of-way. This connection is understandable in
light of how the analysis is likely to proceed. When a court acknowl-
edges that property is involved, it will tend to find reasonable the no-
tion that the owner can require market value compensation for that
property's use. On the other hand, if a court ignores property issues
478. In Dearborn, White Plains, and Cablevision of Boston, respectively.
479. InAuburn.
480. Although it is significant that trial courts in the Ninth Circuit have not, in fact, treated
the Auburn dicta on compensation as preventing market-value rental fees for telecommunications
use of public rights-of-way. This issue was not directly addressed by the Eleventh Circuit, in
Palm Beach, or the Tenth Circuit, in RT Communications.
481. In White Plains, the court discussed property rights perceptively, but did not decide
the issue due to its conclusion regarding discriminatory treatment. In Denver, on the other hand,
the court appears to have reached a contrary conclusion despite acknowledging local property
rights.
482. In other cases discussed above, it does not seem to be clear whether or not the courts
clearly recognized the importance of local property rights, or else the holdings did not clearly
uphold or strike down local rights to compensation.
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and concentrates on regulatory factors or on procedural issues such as
application processes, the court is more likely to think of compensa-
tion as a potential barrier to entry and as reducible to a recovery of
administrative costs. For this reason, litigants who wish to occupy the
public rights-of-way at no cost tend to cast their arguments in terms of
regulation and not property. It would be useful for any decision
maker faced with this issue to confront, and require the parties to ad-
dress, the question: If a telecommunications company is expected to
pay a fair market price for the resources it uses generally, why should
the owner of one such resource-the public rights-of-way-be re-
quired to give it to the company for free?
The line of thought that entices some courts to focus exclusively
on costs as constituting "compensation" appears to involve the follow-
ing steps: fees for use of the public rights-of-way should be directly
related to a given telecommunications company's physical usage of the
rights-of-way (ignoring, for example, inchoate usage such as the op-
tion to build anywhere in the rights-of-way); this physical occupation
imposes burdens on the rights-of-way; those burdens are reflected in
the costs incurred by the local government; therefore the fees should
not exceed the costs caused by physical occupancy.483 This approach
fails to recognize that right-of-way fees are fundamentally rent for the
use of property, not merely indemnification for damage caused to that
property.
The unsoundness of this cost-based reasoning is illustrated by
the fact that one would not apply it in any other case involving prop-
erty rights. No one, for example, argues that a landlord may charge
only enough rent to cover the incremental costs of managing the prop-
erty, or that telecommunications companies may charge their custom-
ers no more than the management costs of operating their systems.
On the contrary, free-market compensation for the use of property is
based not only on the cost of that property, but also on the value of the
property to the user and the price of the nearest available substitute.
Gross revenues are one way of measuring this value to the user-
particularly over the course of a long-term agreement of the sort that
telecommunications companies tend to prefer-because in today's
rapidly developing technological environment the usage, and the re-
sulting value, may change radically over the course of ten or fifteen
years. Thus, the essential insight for a court reviewing the compensa-
tion issue is that revenue-based compensation partially measures the
value of the asset to the user. It is not central to the determination of
483. See, e.g., Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1081, at
1100 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (Order Granting Preliminary Injunction).
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value whether or not a given use increases the impact on the rights-of-
way (meaning the costs incurred by the owner). Rather, the key ques-
tion is whether the owner will be allowed to require market-value
compensation for the use of the owner's property.
Under section 253, this issue tends to play out in terms of control
over use of the public rights-of-way. Traditionally, local communities
exercised considerable control over how their public rights-of-way
were used, even when only a few monopoly users were involved (prin-
cipally public utilities). Recent developments, however, show a re-
markable willingness to deprive local communities of the ability to
control right-of-way use. For example, a state law recently enacted in
Missouri imposes, among other restrictive conditions, a requirement
that local governments issue all permits for right-of-way use by tele-
communications companies within thirty-one days.484 This time limit
deprives the community even of the opportunity for detailed consid-
eration of any concerns that might arise in reviewing a permit applica-
tion.
Restrictions on local property use are invariably justified in terms
of competition. The laudable national goal of facilitating competitive
entry is taken as a basis for preempting local control over local prop-
erty. Such preemption subsidizes telecommunications providers by
giving them cost-free use of public property. The key difficulty with
this position arises because property owners have generally enforced
their control over how their property is used through their power to
exclude. If a tenant does not agree to a property owner's terms and
conditions for property use, the owner may generally evict, or refuse
entry to the tenant in the first place. However, because any potential
for exclusion by a local community from the rights-of-way tends to be
seen as a barrier to competition, there is a considerable danger that the
local community will be left defenseless to depredations upon its prop-
erty rights by those private users who profit from the use of that prop-
erty.
Telecommunications policy involves many important concerns,
including the advantages of competition and the benefits of broadband
deployment. In some circumstances section 253 may be a useful tool
in achieving such goals. But in applying section 253, local property
rights-both those of the local community as well as those of private
owners-must be respected. A sound understanding of how to apply
section 253, one consistent with legislative history and the constitu-
484. See SB 369, 91st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2001), adding Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 67.1836(3) (2002).
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tional principle of federalism, requires attention to the property rights
of the local community.
